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Introduction 
Since the advent of democracy in 1994, the South African government has recognised that in 
order to sustain and advance economic growth and social development in the country, 
electricity, water, transport and telecommunications infrastructure will have to be maintained 
and expanded. Most recently this has been articulated in the National Development Plan 2030 
(the ‘NDP’),1 the South African government’s latest long-term policy strategy to eliminate
poverty and reduce inequality by 2030. The NDP recognises that the development of economic 
infrastructure is a precondition for the provision of basic services and that while South Africa 
has a ‘good core network of national economic infrastructure’, this infrastructure needs to be
robust and extensive enough to meet the country’s industrial, commercial and household 
needs.2 Accordingly, the NDP identifies that government will need to make large investments 
to propel economic activity and given government’s limited finances, it further recognises that
seeking private funding is central to achieving the developmental outcomes. The result is that 
given the scale and complex nature of investing in infrastructure, partnering with the private 
sector through procurement mechanisms such as public-private partnerships has become 
fundamental.3 
Public procurement has taken centre stage in democratic South Africa and it is therefore 
unsurprising that it is regulated not only at constitutional level, but also by a robust regime of 
laws and policy mechanisms at national, provincial and local level. In addition to this, the South 
African courts have also emerged as key role players in the field of South African public 
procurement law, as they regularly interpret and rule on contentious legal issues which emerge 
during the procurement process - a natural consequence of the fact that the role and operation 
of the procurement law regime continues to evolve as government makes increased use of 
public procurement. The courts’ involvement in the development of procurement and 
administrative law in so far as it relates to procurement is particularly evident where the 
procurement process relates to large-scale infrastructure projects in fields such as transport and 
energy. Procurement for the purposes of the development of large infrastructure tends to 
involve a multitude of administrative processes and decisions which are interrelated and which 
1 The South African National Planning Commission, The National Development Plan (2013) available at 
http://goo.gl/1pwFtU (accessed 23 July 2015). 




increasingly demand complex and nuanced responsibilities and considerations for government 
decision-makers to take into account. As a result of this increasingly intricate matrix of 
responsibilities and considerations, it is very often the case that the procurement of large 
infrastructure takes place over extended periods of time. Notwithstanding the robust regime of 
laws which governs public procurement, the South African procurement system remains 
plagued by an array of problems. These problems include unnecessary tenders, over-charging, 
false-billing, poor demand management, scope-creep, unjustifiable escalating costs and the 
unfortunately ever-present element of corruption. 
The direct result of these mounting problems is that the South African government is presently 
faced with a substantial number of legal and other challenges to its procurement processes - 
these challenges are launched by a host of interested parties which range from the unsuccessful 
private sector bidders competing to develop infrastructure projects to, amongst others, civil 
society organisations and the communities affected by the procurement of the infrastructure. 
The intricate nature of the procurement process for large infrastructure and the time it takes to 
conclude the process mean that almost inevitably the legal challenges are launched before the 
full gamut of administrative decisions have been made and the tender finally awarded. The 
effects of these challenges are manifest: they create a tension between the need for government 
to efficiently provide much needed infrastructure in South Africa on the one hand and, on the 
other, the need for unlawful, unreasonable or procedurally unfair public procurement processes 
to be legally reviewed.  
This tension forms the core subject matter of what will follow. Firstly, the paper will provide 
an overview of the regulatory regime governing procurement in South Africa, then it will turn 
to outline the typical process followed when the public-private partnership mode of 
procurement is used.  The paper will then provide a critical analysis of the legal facets of and 
challenges faced by the South African government’s public procurement and administrative 
law processes in relation to using the public-private partnership model to procure infrastructure. 
The paper will conclude with final remarks which shall summarily recapitulate some of the 






Chapter 1 – Infrastructure Procurement in South Africa 
1.1 The regulatory regime governing public procurement in South Africa 
It is the aim of this chapter to provide an overview of the regulatory regime governing the 
procurement of infrastructure in South Africa. This will be done by firstly examining the nature 
of the procurement regime under the Constitution and then the laws and some of the policy 
objects which guide and inform procurement process will be reviewed.  
1.1.1 Public procurement and the Constitution 
It is apposite to acknowledge at the outset that at the centre of South Africa’s procurement 
regulatory regime are the guiding principles articulated in the Constitution.4 Specifically, 
section 217(1) stipulates that when an organ of state in the national, provincial or local sphere 
of government (or any other institution identified in national legislation, for that matter) 
contracts for goods or services, it must do so in accordance with a system which is fair, 
equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-effective. The corollary of this is that all of the 
legislation, related regulations and government policies which comprise the regulatory regime 
in South Africa must serve, protect and promote these five principles outlined in the 
Constitution. These principles will each be considered in turn. 
Bolton notes that the principle of ‘competitiveness’ has a number of meanings. More 
formalistically, it has been defined as a process ‘involving or determined by rivalry; relating to 
or characterised by an urge to compete’, while more broadly it has been defined to mean a 
process which is ‘free to all’ and ‘open to the public’.5 Ultimately however, including 
competitiveness in section 217(1) is most likely to stem from that part of the definition of the 
term which speaks to the process whereby commercial entities ‘engage in similar economic 
activities, whether the activity be the production, distribution, sale or purchase of goods or 
services…as a struggle or contention for superiority.’6 The clear benefits of including this 
element in the Constitution is that it compels the state, through its laws, policies and processes, 
to ensure that it is in a position to compare elements such as pricing and quality when it procures 
goods and services. Moreover, a further consequence is that government contracts may only 
then be awarded after a number of entities have been afforded an opportunity to compete for a 
particular contract – effectively allowing the state to ‘shop around’ before it spends. Evidently, 
the manner in which the principle has been included in the Constitution allows the state a degree 
                                                 
4 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the ‘Constitution’). 




of flexibility in order to ensure the outcome is realised. The competition can therefore take the 
form of solicitation for tenders, getting quotes or competitive negotiations, amongst others.7 
The implications for the private sector are similarly positive: not only is there an incentive to 
innovate, research and develop in order to remain competitive, but there is also pressure to 
increase efficiency and reduce production costs and prices for the goods and services they seek 
to provide.8 The knock-on advantages of the including ‘competition’ in section 217(1) are 
therefore manifest. 
Closely linked to the competitive element of the procurement process is the principle of cost 
effectiveness or efficiency. At its core it refers to the ability to provide adequate or optimum 
return in relation to expenditure and it often serves as a limitation or qualification on the effects 
which increased competition brings.9 The principle is a recurring theme in both the Constitution 
and legislation relating to government administration and procurement: In relation to the 
Constitution, section 33(3)(c), for example, requires that legislation be enacted to ‘promote an 
efficient administration’, section 195(1)(b) similarly provides for the promotion of the 
‘efficient, economic and effective use of government resources’ and finally section 251(1) 
provides that ‘national, provincial and municipal budgets and budgetary processes must… 
promote the effective financial management if the economy, debt and the public sector’.  
In relation to procurement, cost-effectiveness is a principle which must permeate the entire 
process; from planning stage right through to the maintenance and administration of the 
contract. These stages and the effects of the principle will be discussed in greater detail below; 
however, as an interim observation it is important to acknowledge that cost-efficiency is not 
(and should not) be the sole consideration when the state procures goods or services,  nor should 
it refer only to the pricing of the goods or services.10 Attaining the lowest price should not be 
determinative; instead, considerations such as the efficiency with which the goods or service 
can be delivered, reliability, maintenance and operating costs should all be factored into an 
assessment of the cost-effectiveness of a particular state procurement process.11 In regard to its 
limiting effects on the use of competitive procedures, Bolton notes that at all times the 
principles of cost-effectiveness and competition are interrelated and interconnected. Therefore, 
notwithstanding the apparently peremptory phrasing of section 217(1), the state is not 
                                                 
7  Ibid, 42. 
8  Ibid, 41. 
9  Ibid, 43. 
10 Ibid, 44. 
11 C Turpin, Government Procurement and Contracts (1989) at 66. 
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necessarily required to use competitive procedures in order to obtain value-for-money or a cost-
effective result. Where such results may be obtained through limited forms of competitive 
processes or by none at all, then cost-effectiveness must prevail. Naturally, whether procuring 
goods or services warrants the use of a fully competitive process, a limited form of competition 
or none at all depends entirely on the particular circumstances and a diligent consideration of 
the other variables at play such as efficiency, productivity and the other principles at stake in 
terms of section 217(1).12  
In the context of procurement the ‘fairness’ element in section 217(1) requires that processes 
be free from discrimination, just and appropriate in the circumstances, impartial, in conformity 
with the rules or standards and one which is uncorrupted or unprejudiced.13Thus, in accordance 
with a constitutional conception of fairness, ‘fairness’ must be understood in both its 
substantive and procedural forms. Government procurement is administrative in nature and for 
that reason the use of the word ‘fair’ in section 217(1) of the Constitution could be said to refer 
to the procedural rather than substantive conception of fairness. In this regard, Bolton notes 
that procedural fairness finds application in two relationships in the government context: that 
is, the relationship between the state and private contracting parties, and the relationship 
between the state and private contracting parties in relation to each other.14 With regard to the 
former relationship, procedural fairness implies at the very least that the state should afford 
potential contractors sufficient access to the procurement process through wide advertisement 
of government contracts, sufficient time to participate in the process and certainty in relation 
to the rules of the competition. With regard to the latter relationship, procedural fairness would 
require that the state treat all competing contracting parties fairly in relation to each other by, 
for example, allowing the same timelines for the submission of tenders and making the same 
information available to all tenderers.15  
The ‘equity’ requirement in section 217(1) is significant in the South African context and is 
another recurring theme in the Constitution. Formally, it is defined as being that which is fair 
and right. It serves as one of the broader principles of justice which may be relied on to correct 
or supplement the law as applied to particular circumstances.16 Du Plessis explained the equity 
principle as a mechanism by which general legal norms can be individualised to ensure that 
                                                 
12 Bolton op cit (n2) at 45. 
13 Ibid, 47. 
14 Ibid. 




those norms can cater to different situations. Thus, in the context of the Constitution, he notes 
that the values of dignity, equality and freedom all serve as means by which equity can be 
achieved when dealing with rights-related problems by allowing the broad values to be invoked 
to tailor norms so that they may be effectively applied particular circumstances.17 In essence 
therefore, the ‘equity’ principle ensures that achieving justice may require us to recognise 
differences in resources, development, race, circumstances and to provide remedies which 
speak those differences.18 In the context of procurement the equity principle comes into play 
most visibly in the context of affirmative action. Given that the Constitution recognises a 
substantive conception of equality, equity (in the context of procurement) speaks directly to 
the responsibility on the state to ensure that it uses its contracting power as an empowerment 
tool in accordance with the requisites of section 9(2) of the Constitution and the aims of section 
217(2) and 217(3) which allow for preferential procurement.19 
The final principle from section 217(1) to be discussed is the requirement for a ‘transparent’ 
procurement system. The principle refers to the idea of ‘openness’ and it is one of the core 
values of South Africa’s democratic state. Its inclusion in the section is based on the rationale 
that interested or affected parties should be free to scrutinise the procurement procedures to 
foster confidence in government processes. In addition it requires reasoned and rational 
decision-making to ensure accountability.20  In the procurement context, transparency is closely 
linked to the elements of competitiveness and fairness and some of its requirements do overlap. 
Accordingly, if the ‘transparency’ principle is to be realised during state procurement the 
process, it has been argued that the process would need to contain the following elements: the 
terms of the procurement and the criteria upon which decisions will be made must be codified 
as far as possible, the final decision awarding the contract as well as any interim decisions 
should be publicised together with reasons where appropriate and finally, the publicised 
decisions and reasons must be verifiable.21 This element will be discussed in greater detail  
below. 
                                                 
17 LM Du Plessis, ‘Just legal institutions in an Optimally Just South Africa under the 1996 Constitution’ (1998) 
3 Stell LR 239 at 244. 
18 Bolton op cit (n2) at 50. 
19 Ibid, 53. 
20 Ibid, 54. 
21 SJ Evenett & BM Hoekman, ‘Transparency in Government Procurement: What can we expect from 
International Trade Agreements?’ in S Arrowsmith & M Trybus (eds), Public Procurement: The Continuing 
Revolution (2003) at 272. (as cited in Bolton supra) 
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The fact that the aforementioned principles have been constitutionally enshrined, prima facie 
warrants that they should all be complied with whenever the state contracts for goods or 
services. However, the variable nature of state procurement processes (which very often turns 
on the nature of the goods or services being procured) means that the weight attached to each 
of the principles is similarly variable. The total effect must therefore be that the principles in 
section 217(1) must permeate the entire procurement process and the individual elements must 
be balanced to ensure overall compliance.22  
A further consequence of this is that any legislation which is directly aimed at procurement 
processes must be construed in accordance with the constitutional principles and, if it is found 
to be inconsistent, it may be declared invalid for its inconsistency with the principles. The 
legislation governing state procurement processes largely stems from sections 217(2) and (3) 
of the Constitution. These sections allow organs of state to implement ‘a procurement policy 
providing for (a) categories of preference in the allocation of contracts; and (b) the protection 
or advancement of persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination’ 
and that ‘national legislation must prescribe a framework within which the policy referred to 
in subsection (2) must be implemented’. In addition, the sections establish a mechanism 
through which state procurement can be used as a policy tool to realise certain constitutional 
outcomes, such as the achievement of equality, through preferential or differential treatment of 
contractors in certain circumstances. 
Evidently, even though section 217(1) lists five principles, sections 217(2) and (3) create a 
mechanism through which justifiable limitations may be placed on the former section. For 
example, even though section 217(1) requires procurement processes to be ‘fair’ which would 
mean that contractors would have to be treated equally, sanctioning the use of preferential 
treatment of contractors in section 217(2) allows equity to prevail to ensure that the award of 
government contracts take levels of disadvantage into account and the related differing levels 
of resources and development of vulnerable groups in South Africa.23 The constitutional 
provisions in section 217 therefore demonstrably ensure that state funds are spent efficiently, 
economically and lawfully. The fact that South Africa has constitutionally regulated 
procurement provides a solid grounding of core principles which should in theory ensure for a 
good procurement system. 
                                                 
22 Bolton op cit (n2) at 56. 
23 Ibid, 60 – 61. 
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1.1.2 The public procurement legislative framework 
A host of legislation has been enacted to directly give effect to the principles articulated in 
section 217 of the Constitution and there are a number of provisions in other pieces legislation 
which incidentally find application in procurement.  
Beginning with the legislation constitutionally mandated in section 217(2) and (3), the 
Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act (the ‘PPPFA’)24 seeks to directly regulate the 
process through which organs of state implement their preferential procurement policies by 
establishing uniform processes which seek to improve and develop the participation of 
historically disadvantaged persons or groups as well as small businesses. Naturally, the 
Regulations to the PPPFA25 contain the real substance of the legislation and they detail the 
manner in which the procurement framework created by the PPPFA should operate.26 Both the 
PPPFA and the Regulations to the PPPFA make it compulsory for organs of state to implement 
their preferential procurement policies within the legislated framework. This is done by way of 
a preference point system for the award of contracts to redress the effects of the discriminatory 
practices of the apartheid government.  
Practically, in regard to the procurement of infrastructure, tenders are called for and bids are 
evaluated in terms of a point system which takes into account firstly the price and secondly the 
achievement of goals such as the advancement of previously disadvantaged persons and the 
implementation of policy objectives such as those contained in the government’s 
Reconstruction and Development Programme.27 The PPPFA therefore provides that for 
government contracts between R30 000 and R1 000 000 the 80/20 points system applies, in 
terms of which bidders are awarded points out of 80 for price and a maximum of 20 points for 
preference.28 For contracts above R1 000 000 the 90/10 points system applies, with points out 
of 90 for price and a maximum of 10 points for preference.29 Contracts must be awarded to the 
bidder who scores the highest points in terms of the applicable point system unless there are 
objective criteria that justify the award of the contract to another bidder.30 
                                                 
24 Act 65 of 2000. 
25 GNR 502 of 8 June 2011:  Preferential Procurement Regulations, 2011 (Government Gazette No. 34350) 
26 Bolton op cit (n2) at 62. 
27 P Bolton, ‘The Regulation of Preferential Procurement in State-Owned Enterprises’ (2010) 1 TSAR 101 at 
103. 
28 Section 2(b)(ii), PPPFA and regulation 5 of the PPPFA regulations. 
29 Section 2(b)(i), PPPFA and regulation 6 of the PPPFA regulations. 
30 Section 2(1)( f ), PPPFA. See also regulation 9 of the PPPFA regulations, which provides for the award of a 
tender to a bidder that does not necessarily score the highest points provided there are “reasonable and 
justifiable” grounds for doing so. 
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Another important legislative consideration is the applicability of the Public Finance 
Management Act (the ‘PFMA’)31 during the infrastructure procurement process. The South 
African National Treasury (the ‘National Treasury’) has referred to the PFMA as ‘one of the 
most important pieces of legislation passed by the first democratic government in South 
Africa’.32 Its key objective is to promote good financial management in order to maximise 
service delivery through the effective and efficient use of state resources, and it accordingly 
seeks to modernise public financial management, enhance accountability through improved 
access to information related to public finance and eliminate wasteful expenditure and 
corruption.33 It is undoubtedly relevant to the infrastructure procurement process, particularly 
with regard to the financing elements of infrastructure development.  
One of the foundational functions of the PFMA is that it provides a link between the PPPFA 
and the Constitution in relation to state-owned enterprises. This is important because state-
owned enterprises such as Eskom, Telkom, Transnet, the South African National Roads 
Agency, the Industrial Development Corporation and South African Airways amongst others, 
do not fall within the “national, provincial or local sphere of government” as referred to in 
section 217(1). These entities are however identified in the PFMA, which draws a distinction 
between national and provincial public entities as well as the different categories of state-
owned entities which are listed in schedules 2 and 3.  The net effect is that these entities are 
bound by the Constitution, the PFMA and the PPPFA. State-owned enterprises are thus bound 
by the financial management provisions in the PFMA when they develop infrastructure just as 
they are obliged to develop preferential procurement policies in accordance with section 217(2) 
and (3) of the Constitution read together with the PPPFA and its regulations.  
With regard to the PFMA’s regulatory role, there are a number of key provisions relevant for 
present purposes which may be broadly highlighted. Chapter Five of the PFMA ensures that 
all national and provincial institutions and entities have accounting officers,34 sets out out their 
responsibilities35 and the disciplinary sanctions that apply in the event of negligence in 
fulfilling these responsibilities. This chapter obliges accounting officers to produce monthly 
                                                 
31 Act 1 of 1999. The PFMA must be read together with the Public Finance Management Amendment Act (Act 
No. 29 of 1999). The two Acts do not make sense on their own - the initial consolidated bill had to be separated 
into two bills for technical reasons to comply with the Constitution which determines various procedures for 
the passage of bills through Parliament. 
32 The South African National Treasury, ‘Public Finance Management Act’, National Treasury available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/legislation/pfma/ (accessed 13 July 2015) 
33 Ibid. 
34 Section 36, PFMA. 
35 Section 38, PFMA. 
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and annual financial reports for their relevant political heads in order to prevent overspending 
on budgets.36 In accordance with the aforementioned objectives, the chapter clearly clarifies 
the division of responsibilities between the relevant chief executives or heads of department 
(the accounting officer) and the political heads (called the ‘executive authority’ – either a 
Minister or an MEC) when government departments and state organs spend public money.37  
The ostensible benefits of such a regulatory framework in the context of large infrastructure 
development programmes is notable. It clearly establishes that the relevant executive authority, 
as it is termed in the PFMA, is responsible for policy choices and outcomes, while the 
accounting officer implements the policy and achieves the outcomes by taking responsibility 
for delivering the outputs defined in the departmental budget. In this way, the PFMA empowers 
accountability through by unambiguously conferring on parties clear sets of responsibilities: 
Specifically, the accounting officer prepares the departmental budget (specified in terms of 
measurable objectives) for the Minister or MEC to approve and present to the legislature for 
voting and thereafter the accounting officer is responsible for implementing and managing the 
approved budget.38  
Chapter Six of the PFMA, similarly regulates the state-owned companies as per the schedules 
and outlines the fiduciary and other responsibilities of the governing boards of these entities, 
which are similar to the responsibilities of accounting officers.39  
Chapter Eight of the PFMA outlines general principles on borrowing and the issuing of 
guarantees. This chapter gives effect to section 218 of the Constitution on the issuing of 
guarantees and also regulates the borrowing operations of the national government and 
determines the person who can borrow or issue a guarantee, indemnity or security on behalf of 
any national or provincial government entity. In addition, it delineates clearly the purposes for 
which money can be borrowed for a national or provincial department40 and similarly sets out 
the consequences of unauthorised transactions,41 making illegal any other forms of borrowing 
or financial commitment, with strict sanctions applying.  
                                                 
36 Section 39 - 42, PFMA. 
37 Sections 38(1)(l) and 40(4)(c), PFMA. 
38 The South African National Treasury, ‘Guideline for Accounting Officers – Public Finance Management 
Act’, National Treasury available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/legislation/pfma/guidelines/Accounting%20Officers%20Guide%20to%20the%20
PFMA.pdf (accessed 21 July 2015). 
39 Sections 46 – 56, PFMA. 
40 Section 71, PFMA. 
41 Section 68. 
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Chapter Ten of the PFMA defines financial misconduct, and deals with the procedures for 
disciplining those public officials guilty of financial misconduct. Importantly, it includes a 
provision for criminal prosecution to apply where there is gross financial misconduct. 42 Given 
the financial constraints of the South African government, it frequently seeks financing from 
the private sector and regional and international lending institutions, particularly for 
infrastructure development projects. Regulating this process constitutionally and through 
legislation is therefore paramount in ensuring that public funds are spent efficiently and 
effectively. 
Finally, it is certainly worth examining the constitutional and legislative regime governing local 
government procurement. The gamut of rules governing local government services, and 
particularly the contracting out of the delivery of municipal goods and services, which includes 
the development of municipal infrastructure, is largely found in the Municipal Systems Act.43 
In this regard, the five principles set out in section 217(1) of the constitution, are repeated in 
section 83(1)(a) of the Municipal Systems Act, however they do only find applicability when 
a municipality uses a private party for the delivery of a municipal service.  
Similarly, with regard to financial management, as is the case with the PFMA, section 14(5) of 
the Municipal Finance Management Act44 (the ‘MFMA’) repeats the principles set out in 
section 217(1), albeit with a limitation set out in section 14(6).45 Notwithstanding the internal 
limitations in both the Municipal Systems Act and the MFMA, Bolton adopts the view that 
municipalities should always comply with the principle of transparency as a foremost objective 
because ‘the public, as tax payers, have a right to government contracting procedures that are 
open and transparent… in line with the core aims of the Constitution’46 particularly where 
commercial entities exercise public power or carry out public functions.  
With regard to the particular provisions of the MFMA, on a broad level the financial regulatory 
regime it establishes mirrors the provisions of the PFMA with obvious changes as it relates to 
local government. As Conradie terms it, in the spirit of the Constitution, the MFMA provides 
for the functions of national and provincial government in the monitoring and support of local 
                                                 
42 Section 86, PFMA. 
43 Act 32 of 2000 (as amended by Act 44 of 2003). 
44 Act 56 of 2003. 
45 Section 14(6) provides that ‘This section does not apply to the transfer of a capital asset to another municipality 
or to a municipal entity or to a national or provincial organ of state in circumstances and in respect of categories 
of assets approved by the National Treasury, provided that such transfers are in accordance with a prescribed 
framework.’ 
46 Bolton op cit (n2) at 70. 
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government47 - and accordingly its import for the regulation of municipal procurement with 
regard to infrastructure development is manifest. 
1.2 The infrastructure procurement process 
Developing infrastructure such as roads and electricity power stations, as opposed to procuring 
other types of goods and services, is a costly endeavour for any government. The South African 
context is no exception and since the advent of the country’s constitutional democracy in 1994, 
the government has resorted to the use of public private partnerships (PPPs) to mitigate the 
fiscal burden that infrastructure development places on the developing economy.  
Government’s undertaking to procure infrastructure via PPPs is a policy choice demonstrating 
yet another way in which the state is using procurement as a catalyst for social welfare and 
economic growth. Procurement via PPPs is certainly not novel; it has been used around the 
world and it is a particularly prevalent trend amongst developing countries. In South Africa, 
the use of PPPs to develop infrastructure forms part of government’s broader developmental 
strategy to meet international and national developmental goals such as those contained in the 
United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals,48 the Accelerated and Shared Growth 
Initiative for South Africa,49 the Medium Term Strategic Framework50 and the National 
Development Plan,51 amongst others.52 Evidently, in South Africa, a link can be established 
between social welfare and economic growth, the development of infrastructure and 
government’s use of PPPs as a means to procure these ends. The direct consequence of the 
interconnectedness of these elements is that any challenges which government may face in its 
infrastructure procurement system in relation to infrastructure PPPs directly impacts its ability 
                                                 
47 J Conradie, ‘The Municipal Finance Management Act’ (2004), 5(1) Official Journal of the Institute of Municipal 
Finance Officers at 12. 
48 United Nations General Assembly Res 55/2 (18 September 2000). The United Nations’ Millennium 
Development Goals were formulated at the United Nations Millennium Summit in 2000. At the summit, 192 
member states including South Africa and a contingent of other international organisations, formulated eight 
critical economic and social development priorities to be achieved by 2015 in key areas such as education, 
equality, child welfare, the reduction of HIV/AIDS and other diseases, water and sanitation and environmental 
sustainability. Available at http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.pdf (accessed 23 July 2015). 
49 A South African government strategy for raising economic growth and reducing poverty and unemployment by 
2014. Available at http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/docs/reports/asgisa/part2.pdf (accessed 23 July 2015). 
50 The Medium Terms Strategic Framework (MTSF 2009 – 2014) is a government policy document which 
identifies developmental challenges in South Africa and outlines a medium-term strategy to achieve those 
developmental goals. It focuses on ten priority areas intended to improve the living conditions of South 
Africans. Available at http://www.thepresidency-dpme.gov.za/news/MTSF/MTSF%202014-2019.pdf 
(accessed 23 July 2015). 
51 The National Development Plan op cit (n1). 
52 MC Fombad, ‘Enhancing Accountability in Public-Private Partnerships in South Africa’ (2014) 18(3) South 
African Business Review 66 at 66. 
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to achieve economic growth and social welfare goals. For that reason, it is vital to understand 
the procurement system and the internal and external challenges the South African government 
faces in order to posit reforms to improve government’s ability to achieve developmental goals. 
Thus, what follows is a critical overview of the typical PPP procurement process in the context 
of infrastructure development as well as an analysis of some of the key legislative, regulatory 
and external challenges encumbering the system and hindering infrastructure development. 
1.2.1 Public-Private Partnerships  
National Treasury’s PPP Unit defines PPPs, at their most fundamental level, as long term 
contracts between the public and private sector concluded with ‘the main objective of ensuring 
the delivery of well-maintained, cost-effective public infrastructure or services, by leveraging 
private sector expertise and transferring risk to the private sector’.53 This definition accords 
with international characterisations such as the definition used by international finance agency, 
Standard and Poor’s, which defines PPPs as ‘any medium to long-term relationship between 
the public and private sectors, involving the sharing of risks and rewards of multisector skills, 
expertise and finance to deliver desired policy outcomes’.54 For present purposes however the 
following abbreviated definition will be relied on primarily, in accordance with the definition 
in Treasury Regulation 16 to the PFMA (‘Regulation 16’):55 A PPP is a contract between a 
government institution and private party, where the private party performs an institutional 
function and/or uses state property in terms of output specifications, substantial project risk 
(financial, technical, operational) is transferred to the private party and the private party 
benefits through mechanisms such as unitary payments from government budgets and/or user 
fees generated through use of the infrastructure.56 
                                                 
53 National Treasury: Public-Private Partnership Unit, ‘Introducing Public Private Partnerships in South Africa’ 
(2007). Available at http://goo.gl/DkTA4O (accessed on 25 July 2015) at 4. 
54 Standard and Poor’s, ‘Public Private Partnerships: Global Credit Survey 2005’ (2005) Standard and Poor’s 
New York. 
55 Regulation 16 of GNR 225 of 15 March 2005:  Amendment of Treasury Regulations in terms of Section 76 
(Government Gazette No. 27388). 
56 Ibid. Regulation 16 defines public-private partnership as follows: 
“public-private partnership” or “PPP” means a commercial transaction between an institution and a 
private party in terms of which the private party— 
(a) performs an institutional function on behalf of the institution; and/or 
(b) acquires the use of State property for its own commercial purposes; and 
(c) assumes substantial financial, technical and operational risks in connection with the performance of 
the institutional function and/or use of State property; and 




At the outset it is important to note that while PPPs certainly constitute a form of public 
procurement, in certain key respects they differ from the more traditional procurement 
mechanism. Typically, during a traditional procurement processes, government bears the costs 
of capital and operating costs and carries the associated risks such as, for example, any 
additional costs incurred for late delivery or materials cost overruns. The hallmark of the 
traditional procurement method is that while the expertise and experience of a private company 
may be procured for the design and construction of infrastructure, once the asset is delivered, 
the private company is paid and then leaves and the state or state-owned enterprise bears 
responsibility for staffing, maintenance, and operation of the goods or services. PPPs diverge 
from this model in that the public sector procures a full set of services, which includes the 
infrastructure and related services, from the private sector. The public sector then pays for these 
over the term of the PPP agreement, based on successful delivery of the infrastructure.  
The contrasting hallmark of the PPP model of procurement is thus that the private sector 
typically puts its own capital at risk, funding its investment in the project with debt and 
shareholder equity. Accordingly, because of the financial risk the private sector takes, it is 
motivated to provide a high level of service, as good returns on equity will depend on the 
quality of services it delivers. Some PPPs, where fees are generated on a user-pay basis, such 
as toll roads, derive income from which government departments or municipalities can share 
benefits.57 Evidently, there are significant benefits of using PPPs to reduce risk to government, 
particularly in developing countries with limited financial resources. In the South African 
context, the benefits of the PPP model dovetail with the principles in section 217(1) of the 
Constitution and other government-driven policy and social objectives, such as black economic 
empowerment, through aligning the incentives of the private party with the achievement of 
those objectives. This is borne out in the very tests which Regulation 16 prescribes in order to 
determine whether the state or a state-organ may make use of the PPP procurement model.  
In terms of the section, three tests must be met: firstly, it must be determined whether using the 
PPP model will ensure that substantial technical, operational and financial risk transferred to 
the private party to the benefit of government’s risk profile; secondly, it must be determined 
                                                 
(i) consideration to be paid by the institution which derives from a revenue fund or, where the 
institution is a national government business enterprise or a provincial government business 
enterprise, from the revenues of such institution; or 
(ii) charges or fees to be collected by the private party from users or customers of a service provided to 
them; or 
(iii) a combination of such consideration and such charges or fees.” 
57 National Treasury: PPP Unit op cit (n50) at 4. 
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whether the state or state organ can afford envisaged fee; finally it must be determined, in 
accordance with the principle in section 217(1) of the Constitution, whether undertaking the 
project as a PPP is suitable and will result in the state obtaining a value-for-money solution.58 
Turning to the PPP procurement process itself, the provisions of the PFMA and Regulation 16 
form the natural starting point. As described above, Regulation 16 provides a definition of a 
PPP and, in addition, explicitly sets out the phases and tests that a PPP must progress through: 
it establishes two broad phases of the PPP project, namely the feasibility study and the 
procurement phase, and it then superimposes these two broader phases on six more detailed 
stages. The aim of the process is to ensure that the state institution and the private market 
bidders who intend to do develop the infrastructure satisfy certain tests and meet the legal 
requirements set out in the PFMA and Regulation 16.59  
The feasibility phase is the first of the broad phases that the PPP must progress through. 
Regulation 16 requires that relevant accounting officer undertake a feasibility study in order to 
show that commencing with the infrastructure development as a PPP project is beneficial in 
terms of its ability to meet the state’s strategic objectives and other broader government policy 
aims.60 The feasibility study must also clearly explain the nature of the institutional function 
that the PPP will perform and must detail the extent to which the public function may legally 
be performed by a private party.61 Perhaps most importantly, in accordance with the section 
217(1) constitutional requirement of cost-effectiveness, the study must demonstrate that the 
PPP project is affordable,62 that the state will obtain value-for-money63 and it must clearly chart 
the financial, technical and operational risks (and mitigation measures in place) for the state.64 
Ultimately, the feasibility study must demonstrate that the state institution undertaking the PPP 
project has the capacity ‘to procure, implement, manage, enforce, monitor and report on the 
PPP’.65 It must be noted that satisfying all of the requirements at the feasibility stage is 
peremptory for the PPP project to progress and determining whether the requirements have 
indeed been satisfied is the responsibility of the National Treasury. Accordingly, National 
                                                 
58 National Treasury: PPP Unit op cit (n50) at 13. 
59 National Treasury: PPP Unit Practice Note 02 of 2004, ‘Public Private Partnership Manual’, Module 1: South 
African Regulations for PPPs at ii. 
60 Regulation 16.4.1(a). 
61 Regulation 16.4.1(b)(ii). 
62 Regulation 16.4.1(c). 
63 Regulation 16.4.1(e). 
64 Regulation 16.4.1(d). 
65 Regulation 16.4.1(f). 
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Treasury will only grant what is referred to as ‘Treasury Approval: I’ in terms of PFMA 
Regulations 16.4.2 and 16.4.3 should the requirements be met - the state institution will not be 
allowed to proceed to the procurement phase otherwise.  
The procurement phase of the PPP projects is the second of the broad phases. It commences 
once the state institution has demonstrated to the National Treasury, in terms of the 
aforementioned feasibility study, that proceeding with the infrastructure project as a PPP is 
viable. It is thus only at this stage that the state institution will be authorised to invite private 
market entities to submit bids to undertake the infrastructure project. The process begins with 
the state institution preparing the request for qualification (‘RFQ’) documents. The RFQ 
documents enable private market bidders to present to the state institution appropriate 
information about themselves in a uniform manner allowing bidders to be uniformly evaluated 
at this stage.66 The entire object of this stage is to limit the number of private parties eligible to 
participate in the PPP procurement at the outset, ensuring ‘that the successful bidder will have 
not only the qualifications to undertake the project but also the capacity to execute it effectively 
and timeously’.67 However, it is important to note that before the documents can even be issued 
to any prospective bidders, the state institution must obtain ‘Treasury Approval: IIA’,68 the 
approval of the institution’s designated accounting officer in terms of the PFMA and 
Regulation 16, as well as any other approvals which may be required in terms of the institutions 
internal processes.69  It is only once these approvals have been obtained, that the RFQ can be 
advertised and the state institution may receive and evaluate the bids.70  
Once all bids have been received and evaluated by the state institution at the RFQ stage, the 
state institution will publicise the names of only those bidders it selected as having best met 
the criteria. This smaller select group of bidders is now deemed to be ‘pre-qualified’ to submit 
formal bid proposals.71 The state institution will call for these formal proposals by way of a 
request for proposals (‘RFP’) document. At this stage it may be noted that while the RFQ stage 
is predominantly focused on the private entities’ demonstrating their capacity to manage the 
infrastructure project (by focusing on information such as the entities’ skills, expertise, 
financial standing, employment equity, amongst others), the RFP stage is predominantly 
                                                 
66 National Treasury: PPP Unit Practice Note 06 of 2004, ‘Public Private Partnership Manual’, Module 5: PPP 
Procurement at 23. 
67 Ibid at 19. 
68 Regulation 16.5.1 – 16.5.2. 
69 National Treasury: PPP Unit op cit (n63) at 24. 




focused on the state institution’s requirements for the project. The RFP document therefore sets 
out essential minimum requirements for the infrastructure project, project timelines, payment 
mechanisms, penalty regimes and other legal requirements such as the draft PPP agreement.72  
Once the pre-qualified bidders receive the institutions RFP document, they submit their formal 
proposals for evaluation by the state institution and the bidders’ proposals are evaluated on 
three levels: Firstly, the technical evaluation committee will analyse the bidders’ proposals in 
detail by evaluating bidders for their technical approach to the infrastructure project (scoring 
factors such as the proposed engineering and design of the project), their legal approach 
(scoring factors including the bidders’ proposed amendments to the standardised draft PPP 
agreement, which governs the entire relationship between the state and the private entity for 
the duration of the project), the financial approach (scoring affordability, projected costs and 
value-for-money, amongst others), black economic empowerment (scoring factors including 
black ownership of the private entity) and, finally, the total costing or price.73 Secondly, the 
evaluation and co-ordination committee (the ‘ECC’) of the state institution will compile and 
manage the results obtained by the technical evaluation process, they will assess the scoring 
and make recommendations regarding the ‘best and final offers’ process, which allows bidders 
to amend aspects of their bids to improve their chances of being selected as preferred bidder.74  
Finally, the project evaluation committee (the ‘PEC’) is tasked with the final evaluation and 
appointment process. The PEC consists of the state institution’s designated accounting officer 
and other committee members which the accounting officer appoints. The PEC is tasked with 
examining the recommendations of the ECC, calling for best and final offers to be made by the 
bidders’ and then appointing a preferred and reserved bidder.75 As a matter of definition, the 
preferred bidder is the bidder who the state institution prefers over the others to conclude the 
final PPP agreement with and develop the infrastructure project. The reserved bidder, as the 
title suggests, ‘waits in reserve’ but plays a crucial role as the state institution may require that 
the reserve bidder replace the preferred bidder should the preferred bidder withdraw from the 
project or where final negotiations with the preferred bidder compromise the value-for-money 
aspect of the project.76  
                                                 
72 Ibid at 27. 
73 Ibid at 45 – 49. 
74 Ibid at 49 – 50. 
75 Ibid at 50 – 54. 
76 Ibid at 58. 
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The process governing the call for best and final offers from bidders as well as announcing and 
appointing a preferred and reserved bidder can only take place after the state institution has 
obtained ‘Treasury Approval: IIB’,77 which requires that the state institution once again 
conduct affordability, risk and value-for money assessments.78 Importantly, at this stage, it 
must be borne in mind that the PPP agreement has not been concluded between the state 
institution and either of the bidders. Obtaining Treasury Approval: IIB as well as appointing 
the preferred and reserved bidder is the penultimate stage, it merely entitles the state institution 
to commence final negotiations with the preferred bidder with the aim of concluding the PPP 
agreement which, up until this stage, has merely been in draft stage with various amendments 
proposed by the bidder. Once final negotiations commence, the object is to ‘bridge gaps, 
eliminate confusion, and formally clarify terms and conditions’ as well as structure a robust 
agreement that protects the interests of both the state and the private entity.79 The aim remains 
to develop infrastructure in terms of the PPP procurement mechanism in a manner that 
promotes constitutional and government policy objectives.  
As a matter of course, once negotiations have been concluded regarding proposed amendments 
to the PPP agreement but before the agreement is signed by the institution’s accounting officer 
and the bidder’s authorised representatives, the state institution must apply for ‘Treasury 
Approval: III’.80 This approval amounts to a declaration by the parties that the PPP agreement 
meets the requirements of affordability, value for money and substantial technical, operational 
and financial risk transfer in terms of Regulation 16, that the state institution has the requisite 
capacity to implement, manage, enforce and account for the PPP project and that the state 
institution has conducted relevant due diligences and that the private entity has the capacity to 
enter into the PPP agreement.81 Obtaining Treasury Approval: III is usually included as one of 
the conditions precedent to the conclusion of the PPP agreement and consequently, once it has 
been obtained, the agreement may be finally concluded between the state institution and the 
bidder. 
                                                 
77 Regulation 16.5.4 – 16.5.5. 
78 National Treasury: PPP Unit op cit (n63) at 57. 
79 Ibid at 59. 




Chapter 2 – Challenges in public procurement and proposals for reform 
Measuring the efficacy of any procurement system entails not only examining the appropriate 
rules and regulations governing the system but also the challenges facing the system. As 
mentioned previously, public procurement in South Africa faces a number of challenges and 
some of these major challenges will be discussed in further detail in what follows. 
2.1 Lack of knowledge, skills and capacity  
It is arguable that a significant number of the problems which are apparent in public 
procurement in South Africa stems from the lack of proper knowledge, skills and capacity 
prevalent in the organs of state which use PPPs. This has been a persistent critique of public 
procurement systems in the country and it has been highlighted as the single greatest 
impediment to the success of public procurement.82 Appropriate structures within the various 
organs of state as well as fully skilled professionals is fundamental to ensuring that 
procurement systems such as PPPs operate in accordance with constitutional and legislative 
prerequisites. The South African government has recognised this and has indeed embarked on 
programmes that educate officials on proper public procurement procedures: in line with the 
PFMA and the MFMA, departments’ and entities’ accounting officers and accounting 
authorities are responsible for education, training and development in accordance with a 
national framework.83 However, despite this, research has indicated that many public 
procurement actors within the public sector continue to lack appropriate knowledge to ensure 
proper adherence to the rules and regulations.84 This lack of knowledge serves as the genesis 
of many of the systemic problems such as unjustifiable costs and scope-creep and also allows 
for the corruption-related issues such as false billing and unnecessary tenders. On a broader 
level, the lack of knowledge contributes to the pockets of bad governance in organs of state 
throughout the three spheres of government and the various state-owned enterprises.  
                                                 
82 I.M Ambe & J.A Badenhorst-Weiss, ‘A Review of Procurement Practices in the South African Public Sector’ 
(2012) 6 Journal of Transport and Supply Chain Management 437 at 454. 
83 The South African National Treasury, ‘Public Sector Supply Chain Management Review’ (2015) National 
Treasury available at http://www.treasury.gov.za/publications/other/SCMR%20REPORT%202015.pdf 
(accessed 14 June 2016) 
84 S.O Migro & I.M Ambe, ‘Evaluation of the Implementation of Public Sector Supply Chain Management and 
Challenges: A case study of the Central District Municipality, North West Province, South Africa’ (2008) 2 
African Journal of Business Management 230 at 235. 
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2.2 Non-compliance with laws, regulations and tender conditions 
The review conducted earlier in this dissertation clearly indicates that there is an extensive 
regime of laws, regulations and policies that governs public procurement and specifically PPPs 
in South Africa. Given this extensive regime it is therefore unsurprising that the ostensibly 
simple issue of non-compliance with the various processes remains a challenge. The organs of 
state’ and state owned entities’ non-compliance with the legislative regime relates to a host of 
issues and ensuring compliance with this regime is essential to ensuring a lawful procurement 
process. There are a number of areas where the issue of non-compliance is particularly material, 
such as those instances where procuring entities have a tendency to not use competitive 
processes for bids when it is a requisite. However, there are also areas where non-compliance 
is less material but equally prevalent; such as those instances where the preference point system 
is used incorrectly, unqualified suppliers are selected, bids are passed over for incorrect reasons 
or where thresholds and time periods are unlawfully extended.85 In what follows, one of the 
areas in which non-compliance frequently occurs will be considered.  
2.2.1 The regulatory regime governing non-compliance 
The legal regime governing public procurement explicitly requires that organs of state and state 
owned enterprises only consider compliant tenders. That is, only those tenders which have 
complied with all of the aspects of the invitation to tender and any of the other requirements 
stipulated by the procuring entity in its tender documents.86 These requirements are usually 
indicated at the outset but are most patent at the RFQ and RFP stages. In essence they require 
that bidders comply with any tender conditions set by the procuring entity. Failing to comply 
would defeat the underlying purpose of supplying information to bidders for the purpose of 
preparing their tenders and would amount to unfairness if some bidders were allowed to 
circumvent tender conditions. Moreover, it also serves the purpose of ensuring equity amongst 
the bidders, promoting objectivity and encouraging wide competition for the same work on the 
same terms and conditions. There is also a legitimate expectation that by requiring compliant 
tenders, the procuring entity is bound to comply with its own tender conditions.87 
                                                 
85 I.M Ambe & J.A Badenhorst-Weiss op cit (n82) at 455. 
86 P. Bolton ‘Disqualification for Non-compliance with Public Tender Conditions’ (2014) 17(6) PER/PELJ  
2314. 
87 Ibid at  
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It has been noted that very often, procuring entities provide insufficient motivation for 
deviations from the conventional lawful procurement processes and that these entities often do 
not have adequate controls and procedures when such deviations are required.88 However there 
are certainly grounds to motivate that there are instances where strict adherence to tender 
conditions is not an inflexible rule.89 Bolton raises a number of questions in this regard. She 
asks, for example, whether it is peremptory for a procuring entity to disqualify a tender that is 
not signed by a bidder where such a tender is deemed to be a non-compliant tender? Or where 
a particular bidder submits a copy of a tax clearance certificate and not an original one as 
stipulated in the tender invitation? Or further where the price in words in a tender document 
differs from the price stipulated in numbers?90 It is clearly the case that there is a host of 
mistakes (ranging from the more substantive to the more ‘clerical’ in nature) which may occur 
during the tender process and it is important to distil where the line should be drawn before a 
tender is deemed to be non-compliant. These instances of variable degrees of non-compliance 
create their own issues. Namely, it warrants consideration of the extent of procuring entities’ 
discretion to condone mistakes or omissions in tenders, whether courts have the jurisdiction to 
order that a procuring entity exercise its discretion in a particular way as well as whether it may 
order that a bidder be allowed to correct a mistake or omission.91 
At international level, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL): Model Law on Public Procurement92 deals with the examination and evaluation 
of tenders. It provides as follows in Article 43: 
“1.  (a) …the procuring entity shall regard a tender as responsive if it conforms to all 
requirements set out in the solicitation documents in accordance with article 
10 of this Law. 
(b) The procuring entity may regard a tender as responsive even if it contains 
minor deviations that do not materially alter or depart from the 
characteristics, terms, conditions and other requirements set out in the 
solicitation documents or if it contains errors or oversights that can be 
corrected without touching on the substance of the tender. Any such deviations 
                                                 
88 I.M Ambe & J.A Badenhorst-Weiss op cit (n82) at 455. 
89 Bolton op cit (n 86) at 2314. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid at 2315. 
92 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 66/95 of 9 December 2011, United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on Public Procurement. 
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shall be quantified, to the extent possible, and appropriately taken account of 
in the evaluation of tenders. 
2. The procuring entity shall reject a tender: 
(c) If the tender is not responsive.” 
The guidelines provided by the World Bank similarly state as follows: 
“The Borrower shall ascertain whether the bids: 
(a) meet the eligibility requirements specified in paragraph 1.8, 1.9, and 1.10 of these 
Guidelines; 
(b) have been properly signed; 
(c) are accompanied by the required securities or required declaration signed as 
specified in paragraph 2.14 of the Guidelines;  
(d) are substantially responsive to the bidding documents; and  
(e) are otherwise generally in order.  
If a bid, including with regard to the required bid security, is not substantially responsive, 
that is, it contains material deviations from or reservations to the terms, conditions and 
specifications in the bidding documents, it shall not be considered further. The bidder shall 
neither be permitted nor invited by the Borrower to correct or withdraw material deviations 
or reservations once bids have been opened.”93 
The provisions of the international instruments above are largely uniform vis-à-vis the manner 
in which procuring entities’ treat the level of compliance with tender conditions. Both the 
UNCITRAL and World Bank provisions deem a compliant tender as one which complies with 
all of the ‘material’ or ‘substantial’ aspects of the tender conditions set out in the tender 
invitation. Accordingly, organs of state and state enterprises are allowed to consider tenders 
even if their bids contain minor deviations that are not materially different from the terms and 
conditions set out in the tender documents or if the mistakes are formal or ‘clerical’ in nature. 
In South African context the legal and regulatory regime governing public procurement 
similarly emphasises the importance of compliance with both the relevant laws and regulations 
as well as the terms and conditions of the tender. While there are instances where the more 
peremptory language is used in the South African context, Bolton notes that throughout the 
                                                 
93 The World Bank, The World Bank Procurement Guidelines: Procurement of Goods, Works and Non-
Consulting Services Under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits & Grants by World Bank Borrowers (Washington, 
2011) at paragraph 2.48.  
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public procurement regulatory regime, reference is frequently made to the terms ’acceptable’ 
tender as opposed to ‘compliant’ in certain instances.94 This language is apparent in the PPPFA, 
which provides that procuring entities should only consider ‘acceptable’ tenders, which it 
defines in Section 1(i) as: 
‘…any tender which, in all respects, complies with the specifications and conditions of 
tender as set out in the tender document.’ 
National Treasury has further stated in a Practice Note that a tender will only be deemed to be 
‘acceptable’ if: 
‘a) It complies in all respect with the specification and conditions of the bid; 
b) The bidder completed and signed all the prescribed bid forms to enable the 
principal to evaluate the submitted bid; 
c) The bidder submitted the required tax clearance certificate and other 
clearance/registration forms as prescribed by various acts and/or in the bid 
documentation; and  
d) The bidder has the necessary capacity and ability to execute the contract.’95 
The Practice Note goes on to state further that: 
‘…when any [tender] is passed over or regarded as non-responsive, the reasons for 
passing over such [tender] must be defendable in any court of law. Examples in this regard 
may include negative banking reports, non-submission of tax clearance certificates, not 
having the necessary capacity and / or capability, being listed on the Register for Tender 
Defaulters, etc. Deviation by more than a predetermined percentage from the cost estimate 
of the project / commodity cannot be regarded as a justifiable reason for the rejection of a 
[tender] and has, therefore, not been approved as an evaluation norm by the National 
Treasury.’96 
The more peremptory language used in the PPPFA differs from the broader definitions used in 
the international instruments which employ terms such as ‘material’ or ‘substantial’ 
compliance. There are also no provisions governing the waiver of immaterial instances of               
non-compliance. The result is that organs of state and state enterprises in South Africa are 
                                                 
94 Bolton op cit (n 86) at 2320. 
95 The South African National Treasury Practice Note 2 of 2006 at para 1.2.2. 
96 Ibid at paras 1.2.3. to 1.2.4. 
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obliged to exclude bids that fail to comply with the terms and conditions of the tender – there 
is no legislated discretion in this regard.97 
2.2.2 The South African courts’ approach to non-compliance 
Given the lack of legislated discretion, it is vital to examine the South African courts’ treatment 
of compliance with tender conditions. It was mentioned early on in this paper that the courts 
frequently rule on contentious issues such as these. Arguably, with PPPs for large infrastructure 
projects where the costs commonly run into billions of Rands, it is clear that the stakes are 
particularly high. Since the constitutionalisation of South Africa’s public procurement regime 
in 1994, courts have been compelled to confront the issue of what constitutes an ‘acceptable 
tender’ as set out in the regime. Accordingly, what will follow is an overview of how the courts 
have dealt with the issue of compliance with the terms and conditions of tender. 
The Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) was one of the first divisions to tackle this in the case of 
Metro Projects CC and Another v Klerksdorp Local Municipality and Others98 (the ‘Metro 
Projects’ case). In the Metro Projects case, the Municipality had put out a tender to have a 
large township within its jurisdiction developed. The tender was awarded to a bidder who was 
afforded an opportunity by a municipal official to amend its tender despite the fact that the 
formal tender process has been closed. The court did not rule on whether the deception that led 
to the opportunity was afforded negligently or actively perpetrated unlawfully by the official 
in cooperation with the bidder; however, what was apparent was that it allowed the bidder to 
ensure that its tender was acceptable.99 The SCA referred to the seminal case of Logbro 
Properties CC v Bedderson NO and Others100 in which Cameron JA referred to the ‘ever-
flexible duty to act fairly’ that rested on a tender committee and then held that: 
‘Fairness must be decided on the circumstances of each case. It may in given circumstances 
be fair to ask a [bidder] to explain an ambiguity in its tender; it may be fair to allow a 
[bidder] to correct an obvious mistake; it may, particularly in a complex tender, be fair to 
ask for clarification or details required for its proper evaluation. Whatever is done may not 
                                                 
97 Bolton op cit (n 86) at 2321. 
98 (2004) 1 All SA 504 (SCA). 
99 Ibid at paras 1 to 10. 
100 (2003) 1 All SA 424 (SCA) at paras 8 to 9. 
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cause the process to lose the attribute of fairness or, in the local government sphere, the 
attributes of transparency, competitiveness and cost-effectiveness.’101 
The SCA held that the deception which occurred in the Metro Projects case denuded the tender 
process of the fundamental element of fairness which demanded that tenders were evaluated 
equally. Where this occurs, the court went on, the essence of a tender process was compromised 
and the other competing bidders were prejudiced, regardless of whether or not they in fact stood 
a chance of winning the tender or not.102 The court reiterated that the PPPFA explicitly defines 
what constitutes an acceptable tender but noted that: 
‘There are degrees of compliance with any standard and it is notoriously difficult to assess 
whether less than perfect compliance falls on one side or the other of the validity divide. 
Whether or not there can in any particular case be said to have been compliance with 'the 
specifications and conditions of tender' may not be an easy question to answer.’103 
In the Metro Projects case however the court found that the tender before the municipality in 
question was not the non-compliant one initially made by the bidder.104 Accordingly, the award 
of the tender was set aside. 
The SCA pronounced on the meaning of ‘acceptable tender’ a year later in the case of 
Chairperson: Standing Tender Committee and Others v JFE Sapela Electronics (Pty) Ltd and 
Others.105 In this matter, the bidder submitted a tender which included reduced prices for 
services which would not need to be done as this work was already the subject of municipal 
tender which the provincial office was not aware of.106 The tender was awarded to this bidder 
and an unsuccessful bidder challenged the award on the basis that other bidders who tendered 
on the basis that all the work had to be done were prejudiced.107 Ultimately the court ruled that 
the successful bidder’s tender offended each of the core values set out in  section 217(1) of the 
Constitution  and that it would not be a tender which is ‘acceptable’ within the meaning of the 
Preferential Act. The court held as follows on the definition of ‘acceptable tender’ in terms of 
the definition articulated in the PPPFA: 
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‘The definition of 'acceptable tender' in the Preferential Act must be construed against the 
background of the system envisaged by s 217(1) of the Constitution, namely one which is 
"fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-effective". In other words, whether "the 
tender in all respects complies with the specifications and conditions set out in the contract 
documents" must be judged against these values.’108 
The SCA’s decision in the case of Minister of Social Development and Others v Phoenix Cash 
& Carry PMB CC109 is similarly relevant to the issue of compliance with the terms and 
conditions of tender. In this case, the National Department of Social Development disqualified 
the bidder’s tender for non-compliance in respect of certain financial aspects of its tender. 
Specifically, the Department of Social Development excluded the bidder on the basis that as a 
result of the fact that it had failed to provide mandatory information such as its financial 
statements.110 The court invoked its findings in the Metro Projects case on the ever-flexible 
duty of a tender committee to act fairly and that fairness must be decided in the context of the 
circumstances of each case.111 Ultimately the court found that the Department of Social 
Development placed undue emphasis on a relatively formal issue at the expense of substance 
and held, in relation to the provisions of section 217(1) of the Constitution, that there is a need 
for organs of state and state-owned enterprises to: 
‘…appreciate the difference between formal shortcomings which go to the heart of the 
process and the elevation of matters of subsidiary importance to a level which determines 
the fate of the tender.’112 
This approach was also adopted by the SCA in the case Millennium Waste Management (Pty) 
Ltd. v Chairperson of the Tender Board: Limpopo Province and Others (the ‘Millennium Waste 
Management’ case).113 The case concerned the decision by the Provincial Department of Health 
and Social Development to award a tender to a consortium of companies for the provision of 
services relating to the removal, treatment and disposal of healthcare waste material from a 
number of hospitals in the province of Limpopo.114 The appellant in the matter was an 
unsuccessful bidder who alleged that its tender should not have been disqualified merely 
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because it failed to sign a mandatory ‘declaration of interest’ which required bidders to indicate 
whether they had any ties to the department. The consortium had initialled every page of the 
document but failed to sign the last page.115 
The department’s tender committee disqualified the consortium on two bases: Firstly, it 
believed that it did not have the power to condone the consortium’s non-compliance with the 
terms and conditions of the tender itself. Secondly, the department claimed that the 
consortium’s tender was not ‘acceptable’ in law in accordance with the definition of 
‘acceptable tender’ as defined in the PPPFA.116 On the first ground, the court relied on the 
regulations to the Northern Transvaal Tender Board Act,117 which states as follows in 
Regulation 5(c): 
“… the Board may accept any offer notwithstanding the fact that the offer was not made in 
response to any particular tender invitation, or does not comply with the tender invitation 
in respect of which the offer has been made.”118 
Accordingly, the court found that the department did in fact have the power to legally 
condone the consortium’s non-compliance with the peremptory requirements of the tender. 
It further held that, as a general principle, condonation may be granted by the body in who’s 
whose benefit the condition was enacted provided that such condonation is not 
incompatible with public interest.119 In the Millennium Waste Management case, the court 
found that condoning the consortium’s failure to sign the form would have been in the 
public interest because it would have promoted competition amongst the bidders in 
accordance with the requisites of section 217(1) of the Constitution.120 
The second ground which the department relied on to disqualify the consortium’s bid was 
also rejected by the court. When dealing with the ‘acceptability’ of the bid in the context 
of the PPPFA, the court held that when Parliament promulgated the PPPFA: 
“…it was complying with the obligation imposed by s 217(3) of the Constitution which 
required that legislation be passed in order to give effect to the implementation of a 
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procurement policy referred to in s 217(2). Therefore, the definition in the statute must 
be construed within the context of the entire s 217 while striving for an interpretation 
which promotes "the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights" as required by s 
39(2) of the Constitution.’121 
The court held that the definition of an ‘acceptable’ tender cannot be given a literal meaning. 
Adopting this approach would mean that bidders would be compelled to have their offers 
comply with the terms and conditions of tender even if those terms and conditions are 
immaterial, unreasonable or unconstitutional.122 In this instance, the correct approach would 
require that the department take into account the purpose of the declaration of interest form in 
relation to the entire tender process. The court held that the conditions of tender should not be 
applied mechanically without regard to the constitutional principles. The department’s decision 
was thus based on its erroneous belief that the consortium’s omission amounted to a failure to 
comply with a legislative condition in the PPPFA – a mistake in law as contemplated in section 
6(2)(d) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (the ‘PAJA’).123 The result was that the 
tender process followed by the department was deemed to be inconsistent with the PAJA and 
the Constitution and its decision to disqualify the consortium had to be set aside.124  
The foregoing review of the case law demonstrates that South African courts appear to be 
adopting a flexible approach to the issue of compliance with tender conditions. While the term 
‘acceptable tender’ is defined narrowly in the PPPFA, the courts have linked it to section 217(1) 
of the Constitution and emphasised that organs of state and state owned enterprises must draw 
a distinction between shortcomings in tenders which are formal and those which are 
substantive. Bolton notes that section 217 of the Constitution mitigates the prescriptive wording 
contained in the PPPFA because procuring entities are obliged to interpret the definition of an 
acceptable tender with reference to the principles in section 217(1).125 Consequently, in 
accordance with the international instruments referred to above, only substantial or material 
compliance is required. This allows tenders to be deemed to be ‘acceptable’ even if they contain 
minor deviations that do not materially alter or depart from the terms and conditions prescribed 
                                                 
121 Ibid at para 18. 
122 Ibid at para 19. 
123 Act 3 of 2000. 
124 Millennium Waste Management op cit (n 113) at para 21. 
125 Bolton op cit (n 86) at 2336. 
31 
 
by the tender documents, or if they contain errors or oversights that can be corrected without 
touching on the substance of the tender.126 
Notwithstanding the historical case law review outlined above, it is worth noting that the SCA 
adopted a different approach in the case Dr JS Moroka Municipality and Others v Betram (Pty) 
Limited (the ‘Dr JS Moroka Municipality’ case).127 The municipality in question had published 
an advertisement calling for tenders for the provision of toilets. In the invitation to tender it 
was explicitly stated that a failure to submit the required documents would ‘render a tender 
liable to rejection’ and, in addition, it listed a number of documents as being ‘minimum 
qualifying requirements’ to be made available as ‘the prerequisite for (tenderers) to qualify for 
evaluation’. As part of the terms and conditions of the tender bidders were thus required to be 
in good standing with the South African Revenue Service and it was therefore necessary for 
them to submit a tax clearance certificate.128 The municipality received a number of tenders - 
the first respondent’s tender was rejected on the basis that it submitted a copy of a tax clearance 
certificate and not an original. The tender was accordingly awarded to the second respondent 
instead despite the fact that the second respondent’s quote was almost R2 million higher than 
that of the first respondent. 
In the High Court, it was held that the disqualification of the first respondent’s tender had been 
administratively unfair. The High Court therefore declared both the exclusion of the first 
respondent’s tender and the consequent award of the contract to the second respondent to be 
invalid. The High Court did however recognise that the contract had already been partially 
completed and, in order to avoid the second respondent being unnecessarily prejudiced, it 
granted further relief similar to that issued by this court in the Millennium Waste Management 
case129 - essentially obliging the municipality to evaluate the tender of the first respondent, 
compare it to that of the second respondent and then to accept whichever of the two was found 
to be preferable. The High Court reasoned that it was in any event the municipality’s duty to 
determine whether the first respondent’s tax affairs were in order and, for this purpose, the 
submission of an original tax clearance certificate was not a ‘critical requirement’.130 
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The municipality unsurprisingly appealed this decision. The SCA found that the underlying 
reasoning of the High Court was ‘doubtful’ given the fact that the secrecy provisions contained 
in section 4 of the Income Tax Act131 would have made it particularly challenging for a 
municipality to investigate the tax affairs of any tenderer.132 However, more pertinently, the 
SCA held that: 
‘…it was for the municipality, and not the court, to decide what should be a prerequisite 
for a valid tender, and a failure to comply with prescribed conditions will result in a 
tender being disqualified as an ‘acceptable tender’ under by the PPPFA unless those 
conditions are immaterial, unreasonable or unconstitutional.’133 
The SCA added that the requirement that tenders should only be awarded to persons whose tax 
affairs have been declared by SARS to be in order is evident throughout the legislation and 
regulations governing public procurement and it was never argued that this requirement is in 
any way unconstitutional, unreasonable, irrelevant or immaterial. Moreover, it was noted that 
none of the respondents argued that it was unreasonable, irrelevant or immaterial for the 
municipality to have required an original, rather than a copy, of a tax clearance certificate.134 
The court also did not accept the first respondent’s argument that the municipality had 
discretion to condone none compliance with a peremptory condition of tender. Referring to a 
previous decision of the SCA it was then held that an administrative authority has no inherent 
power to condone failure to comply with a peremptory requirement - it only has such power if 
it has been afforded the discretion to do so.135 Similarly, the tender documents themselves did 
not afford the municipality any discretion to condone non-compliance with the terms and 
conditions of tender.136  
Ultimately, seemingly contrary to the line of precedent which came before it, the court in the 
Dr JS Moroka Municipality case held as follows: 
‘…insofar as the judgment in the Millennium Waste Management case may be 
construed as accepting that a failure to comply with the peremptory requirement of a 
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tender may be condoned by a municipal functionary who is of the view that it would be 
in the public interest for such tender to be accepted, it should be regarded as 
incorrect.’137 
2.2.3 A critique of the courts’ approach to non-compliance 
It is trite that decisions to exclude bidders from a tender process amounts to administrative 
action and may be subjected to judicial review. Judicial oversight is fundamental to ensuring 
that these decisions are constituently compliant and, as is evident from the review of the case 
law above, our courts have indeed exercised their oversight on many occasions with vastly 
divergent outcomes. This should not at all be surprising given the fact that the administration 
of justice is highly contextual and fact sensitive. What may amount to an administratively fair 
exclusion of a bidder on grounds of non-responsiveness in one context may not be regarded as 
fair in a different context. Judicial pronouncements on the issue of non-compliance must 
therefore be understood in the factual matrix of each decided case.138 
The decision in the Dr JS Moroka Municipality case was decided in the context of the 
submission of tax clearance certificates, but the findings of the SCA will also naturally be 
applicable to compliance with tender conditions more generally. In that case, the court 
effectively adopted a stringent approach to compliance with tender conditions. Given the 
potentially far-reaching implications of this approach as well as the strong line of cases that 
came before it which appear to adopt a more flexible approach, it is essential to interrogate the 
SCA’s findings in the matter. Bolton has opined that the overall reasoning in the Dr JS Moroka 
Municipality case is problematic for a number of reasons. Amongst others, she identifies the 
following issues in the courts reasoning:139  
1. The finding that the definition of an "acceptable tender" in the PPPFA does not grant 
any discretion when evaluating compliance with tender conditions unless the conditions 
imposed are immaterial, unreasonable or unconstitutional;  
2. The finding that a tender invitation itself may not necessarily afford procuring entities 
any discretionary power; and 
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3. The finding that there are a number of public policy considerations which play a role in 
the evaluation of tenders and therefore the decision in SA Eagle Insurance could not be 
relied upon in the context of the case. 
Each of these findings will be considered in turn and refuted in order to demonstrate that 
adopting a flexible approach to the issue of non-compliance with the conditions of tender is the 
most constitutionally compliant one.  
2.2.3.1 The definition of an ‘acceptable tender’ 
Bolton argues that the definition of ‘acceptable tender’ in the PPPFA can be interpreted to 
provide a degree of discretion to procuring entities when they evaluate a bidders’ compliance 
with the terms and conditions of tender.140 She notes that in light of the fact that the PPPFA 
was enacted to give effect to section 217(3) of the Constitution, it should be interpreted with 
reference to section 217 as a whole and, in particular, the principles contained in section 
217(1).141 This approach echoes the one adopted by the courts up until judgment in the Dr JS 
Moroka Municipality case was handed down by the SCA. It will be recalled that the court in 
the Metro Projects case reiterated the views of Cameron JA in the Logboro Properties case 
which referred to the ‘ever-flexible duty’ of a tender committee to act fairly and to the need for 
fairness to be decided on the circumstances of each case.142 Similarly, the court in the JFE 
Sapela Electronics case emphasised the need to construe the definition of ‘acceptable tender’ 
against ‘the background of the system envisaged by section 217(1) of the Constitution’.143  
Evidently, a compelling case can be made to adopt a more flexible approach to condoning     
non-compliance with the terms and conditions of tender on the basis of the case law; however, 
Bolton does posit another alternative – amending the definition contained in the PPPFA. It will 
be recalled that section 1(i) of the PPPFA defines an ‘acceptable tender’ quite stringently when 
a literal interpretation is adopted. This differs markedly from the definitions of the term in 
international instruments enacted by the UNCITRAL and World Bank which are more flexible 
and make provision for the waiver of minor informalities or deviations.  
Accordingly, Bolton suggests that an ‘acceptable tender’ could be defined in terms that more 
closely reflect the definition provided for in the UNCITRAL Model Law on Public 
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Procurement. This model law does after all serve as a framework or template for developing 
and reforming regulatory systems for public procurement around the world. She advances the 
following modified definition for the PPPFA: 
‘1 (a) subject to subparagraph (b) of this paragraph, the term "acceptable tender" 
means any tender which, in all respects, complies with the specifications and 
conditions of tender as set out in the tender document. 
(b) A tender may be regarded as acceptable, even if it contains minor deviations 
that do not materially alter or depart from the characteristics, terms, 
conditions and other requirements set out in the tender documents or if it 
contains errors or oversights that can be corrected without touching on the 
substance of the tender. Any such deviation shall be quantified, to the extent 
possible, and appropriately taken account of in the evaluation of tenders. 
(c)  A tender shall be rejected if it is not acceptable.’ 
Bolton’s revised definition may certainly be endorsed – it allows procuring entities a measure 
of discretion when they evaluate compliance with tender conditions. However, as she notes, 
until such time as an amendment is actually effected the argument for relying on a more flexible 
interpretation of the definition in the PPPFA based on the provisions of section 217(1) should 
be adopted. 
2.2.3. Discretionary powers and condonation: a purposive approach 
The question as to whether or not a tender is compliant with the terms and conditions of tender 
turns not only on the definition of what an ‘acceptable tender’ is in the PPPFA, but also on the 
language used in the tender documents and the discretion that procuring entities have to 
condone bids where they do not confirm precisely to the conditions of the tender in those 
documents. The Constitutional Court (CC) in the recent case of AllPay Consolidated 
Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd and others v Chief Executive Officer of the South African Social 
Security Agency and Others144 (the ‘AllPay’ case) dealt with this very issue. 
The salient facts of the case are as follows: The South African Social Security Agency 
(SASSA) put out a tender for a countrywide system which would manage the payment of social 
grants which the state provides. SASSA received many bids but the tender was ultimately 
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awarded to to Cash Paymaster Services (Pty) Ltd (the successful bidder).  An unsuccessful 
tenderer, AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd (the unsuccessful bidder), 
contended that the award of the tender to Cash Paymaster that it was not constitutionally valid. 
As a result, it brought a review application in the North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria for the 
setting aside of the tender award.  The High Court declared the tender process invalid, but 
declined to set the award aside because of the practical upheaval this would have involved. The 
unsuccessful bidder then appealed to the SCA against the refusal to set aside the award however 
the appeal was dismissed. The matter was then taken on further appeal to the CC.145 
In the AllPay case the CC avoided both an overly rigid as well as an overly flexible approach 
to the issue of bid responsiveness and adopted a purposive approach instead. Justice Froneman 
noted that the crucial question that must be asked is whether what the applicant (bidder) did 
constituted compliance with the statutory provisions in light of their purpose.146 Therefore, if 
the purpose of the terms or condition of tender was achieved despite the fact that the provision 
was not fully complied with, the bidder should be regarded as sufficiently compliant or 
responsive and not be disqualified.147 The purposive approach is less stringent as it engages 
with the more fundamental issue of whether a bid requirement is material (that is, whether it 
serves an important purpose) and whether that purpose was in fact achieved despite imperfect 
compliance. It moves away from classifying the conditions of tender as mandatory or 
peremptory.148 This approach is by no means novel in South African law.  In fact, it was 
employed in the Millennium Waste Management case discussed earlier where the SCA held 
that there are certainly instances where substantial compliance with the terms and conditions 
of tender as opposed to perfect compliance would suffice.  
One of the grounds raised by the unsuccessful bidder in the AllPay case was that the successful 
bidder, had failed to comply with a mandatory requirement of the RFP. The unsuccessful bidder 
did not prepare separate bids for each of the provinces in South Africa for which it intended to 
submit RFP responses but simply submitted one bid – failing to comply with the precise 
wording of the tender documents. The CC adopted a purposive approach with regard to the 
compliance with the conditions of tender and reasoned as follows: 
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‘The purpose of separate bids for the provinces was surely to enable SASSA to assess 
whether the bidder would be able to provide the necessary services in each of the 
provinces for which it bid. This purpose was attained.’149 
Adopting this approach thus allowed the procuring entity a degree of discretion and the ability 
to condone an ostensibly ‘non-responsive’ tender as it did in fact comply with the material 
aspects of the conditions of tender. What can be distilled from this finding is that it is 
fundamental that procuring entities interrogate whether the purpose of the bid requirement was 
achieved.150 Moreover, is also important to determine whether the bid requirement itself is 
material i.e. whether it serves an essential purpose. In terms of the PAJA, an organ of state may 
be taken on review if ‘a mandatory and material procedure or condition prescribed by an 
empowering provision was not complied with’ (my emphasis).151The consequence of the CC 
adopting this purposive approach is that now, in order to launch a successful review application 
based on non-compliance with the conditions of tender, it must be established that the provision 
in question is both mandatory and material. Non-compliance with a requirement which has 
been categorised in the bid document as mandatory but which does not serve a material purpose 
should therefore not be regarded as a fatal irregularity.152 In this regard, the wording of the RFP 
tender documents will play a central role in determining both the materiality and purpose of 
the bid requirements.  
Procuring entities now appear to have powers to condone ostensibly non-responsive bids by 
adopting a purposive approach to interpreting compliance with the conditions of tender 
however this power is not entirely uncircumscribed. Indeed, it has been argued that the 
groundwork for the purposive approach laid down by the Millennium Waste Management case 
and confirmed in the AllPay case may be overly broad and imprecise.153 Proponents for this 
view postulate that most administrators are not legal professionals yet they are frequently 
required to make decisions which have immense legal consequences. For this reason, they note 
that administrators require a clear and logical framework which will both guide their decision-
making and circumscribe their discretionary powers.154 While there is a degree of merit to this 
line of reasoning, administrators and courts must be cautioned against elevating immaterial, 
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irrational and unreasonable bid requirements to a level where they are allowed to determine the 
fate of the bid. As such they are at odds with the principles outlined in the AllPay case.155 
There are a number of somewhat relatively extreme examples in the South African case law 
where formalism prevailed over pragmatism and the purports of section 217 of the Constitution 
were overlooked. Volmink has cited a number of these as examples.156 In VE Reticulation (Pty) 
Ltd and Others v Mossel Bay Municipality and Others157 the Western Cape High Court upheld 
a municipality’s decision to disqualify a bidder who failed to provide a certificate issued by the 
Electrical Contracting Board even though the certificate was irrelevant for the purposes of the 
services which the municipality tendered for and was erroneously included in the tender 
conditions. Similarly, in Basadi JV & Others v MEC of Education, Province of the Free State 
&Others158 prima facie reasonable conditions of tender were applied in an unreasonable 
manner. In this case, the court upheld a decision taken by an administrative body to disqualify 
an unincorporated joint venture for failing to provide a valid tax clearance certificate, even 
though both companies which formed the joint venture submitted valid tax certificates and the 
unincorporated joint venture had no legal obligation to provide such a certificate.159 
Ultimately, the CC’s judgment in the AllPay case provides appropriate guidance on the 
principles governing how the state and state organs must deal with conditions of tender when 
procuring goods or services. Bidders and procuring entities may not disregard conditions of 
tender at a whim however they must simultaneously guard against applying adhering to those 
conditions in a formalistic or mechanical fashion.  Administrators must ensure that not all the 
conditions of tender must be applied with the same degree of strictness when assessing bids. 
Not every instance of non-compliance with the conditions of tender should automatically 
disqualify a bid. The assessment process must be fair, accompanied by a clear framework to 
assist administrators and reasoning must be context-sensitive. An administrator’s decision 
whether or not to exclude a non-compliant bidder from a tender process will depend on a host 
of factors such as the wording of the RFP, the materiality of the unfulfilled conditions, the 
degree of non-compliance and the purpose of the condition. This approach would ensure that 
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the entire tender process would be compliant with the objectives enshrined in section 217(1) 
of the Constitution. 
2.3 Corruption 
Accountability is one of the cornerstone principles of the public procurement law regime in 
South Africa as it is in many procurement regimes around the world. Without a procurement 
system which is both transparent and accountable, the vast resources which the state channels 
and develops through public procurement systems is at risk of being abused through corruption 
and misuse of funds.160 It is without doubt that since the advent of democracy in1994, South 
Africa has seen an exponential increase in social and infrastructural programmes aimed at 
improving the quality of the lives of its citizens. Yet there is increasing sentiment that there is 
a lack of good governance and poor service delivery which, to a large extern, is a result of 
increased fraud and corruption.161 This sentiment is not misplaced and is supported by statistics. 
Estimates gleaned from a report to Parliament by South Africa’s Special Investigating Unit 
show that up to twenty percent of the South African government’s procurement budget – which 
amounts to approximately R25 billion – may be lost to corruption every year.162 This staggering 
figure is the consequence of a host of systemic problems. The list of these problems is extensive 
and includes broad issues such as inadequate accountability measures, ineffective Broad-based 
Black Economic Empowerment measures and poor transparency measures. It also contains 
more niche issues such as incompetent officials, as discussed above, as well as bid rigging, 
conflicts of interest, urgent tenders which lead to seeking justification to bend the rules and 
multijurisdictional corruption (deals between parties in two different countries, for example, 
arms deals).163 What follows is an examination of corruption within public procurement in 
South Africa and some of the measures that are used to address it. In particular, the definitions 
and types of corruption will be considered with reference to international instruments to which 
South Africa is a party and domestic legislation such as the Prevention and Combating of 
Corrupt Activities Act (the ‘Corruption Act’).164 
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2.3.1 A definition of ‘corruption’ 
Finding an all-encompassing definition of the concept of corruption can be difficult. The term 
is infused with moral and ethical elements and in almost any society it is a particularly sensitive 
subject. When broadly defined ‘corruption’ undoubtedly offends inherent and possibly 
universal values but even so it has been suggested that corruption may be culture-specific: It 
could certainly be argued that there is a dichotomy between conceptualisations of corruption 
when viewed from the perspective of western and non-western interpretations of the term.165 
However, despite these challenges, there are no shortage of serviceable definitions which 
capture the essence of the concept.  
One of the more widely used definitions defines the terms as follows: 
‘Corruption is behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because 
of private regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; 
or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence.’166 
In distilling the quintessence of this definition we may turn to the comparatively simpler 
definition used by the World Bank, namely that corruption is the abuse of public office for 
private gain.167 In the South African context we may refer to two international instruments 
which the country is a party to, namely the African Union Convention on Preventing and 
Combating Corruption168 and the United Nations Convention Against Corruption.169 Both 
international instruments recognise that corruption has become a transnational phenomenon 
that affects all societies and economies making international cooperation to prevent and control 
it essential. The instruments aim to promote and strengthen measures in signatory-countries 
that prevent, detect, combat and punish corruption and further promote integrity, accountability 
and proper management of public affairs and public property. 170 The important role of these 
instruments cannot be understated - it is globally recognised that public procurement as a 
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sphere of government activity is a major area in which corruption takes place and South Africa 
is no exception. This is so because public procurement, particularly in the case of large 
infrastructure projects,  tends to involve large sums of money; the contracting entities involved 
are frequently non-commercial nature; the unique nature of the relationship between the 
decision-maker and the public body, which is such that deviating from the public interest will 
not normally affect the decision-maker’s personal finances; the broad and often unsupervised 
level of discretion afforded to decision-makers; bureaucratic rules which provide insufficient 
regulation and guidance to governments and private parties.171 
With regard to the domestic regulation and penalisation of corruption, in South Africa the 
Corruption Act is the primary piece of legislation giving effect to the country’s international 
obligations on the issue. It is instructive to recant its definition of corruption in section 3: 
“Any person who. directly or indirectly- 
a) accepts or agrees or offers to accept any gratification from any other 
person, whether for the benefit of himself or herself or for the benefit of 
another person; or 
b) gives or agrees or offers to give to any other person any gratification, 
whether for the benefit of that other person or for the benefit of another 
person, 
in order to act, personally or by influencing another person so to act, in a manner- 
i) that amounts to the- 
aa) illegal, dishonest, unauthorised, incomplete, or biased; 
or 
bb) misuse or selling of information or material acquired in 
the course of the, 
exercise, carrying out or performance of any powers, duties or functions arising out of 
a constitutional, statutory, contractual or any other legal obligation; 
ii) that amounts to- 
aa) the abuse of a position of authority; 
bb) a breach of trust; or 
cc) the violation of a legal duty or a set of rules; 
iii) designed to achieve an unjustified result; or 
iv) that amounts to any other unauthorised or improper 
inducement to do or not to do anything, 
is guilty of the offence of corruption.” 
This comprehensive definition of corruption in the Corruption Act is part of the move to 
develop a coherent and integrated approach to combating public sector corruption in South 
Africa. In addition to defining the term, the Corruption Act also creates certain offences that 
may be committed by defined categories of persons, such as public officials, judicial and 
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legislative officers. Moreover, it creates two offences that are peculiar to the procurement 
context and further prohibits a public official from acquiring a private interest in a contract 
connected with the public body in which he or she is employed.172 These mechanisms will be 
discussed in greater detail further below. 
2.3.2 The types of corrupt activity in public procurement 
Corruption in public procurement can take the form of private or public corruption. The private 
corruption usually takes the form of collusion, price fixing, maintenance of cartels or other 
uncompetitive practices which bidders may engage in to the detriment of the procuring entity. 
These practices can be as pervasive as public corruption and they are similarly prohibited in 
South Africa.173 While this form of corruption does occur in public procurement in South 
Africa, for present purposes it will not be discussed in detail save to mention that these practices 
are predominantly defined, regulated and penalised by the competition or anti-trust laws in the 
country. Public corruption, on the other hand, refers to situations where a supplier engages in 
outlawed activity in order to influence the public official responsible for making procurement 
decisions. This generally takes the form of bribes or other non-monetary inducements which 
are offered in order to impact the decision-making process.  
There are numerous examples of the form that public corruption may take. It may be as simple 
as a public official improperly exercising his or her discretion by deciding to which firm to 
award the tender, or in deciding which firms to invite for tender, or by formulating contract 
evaluation criteria which may favour a particular bidder.174 However, it can be more elaborate, 
such as instances where a procurement official may improperly exercise his or her discretion 
by deciding to split a large tender into several smaller ones in order to avoid the thresholds set 
out in the MFMA, PFMA or PPPFA and the related regulations in order to avoid the procedural 
requirements they impose for certain thresholds.175 Other improper benefits that a bidder may 
seek from a procurement official include the avoidance of a government-imposed cost such as 
fees or taxes in relation to the tender. A bidder may also request that a condition of tender be 
waived such as an obligation to provide certain documentation or that a contractual requirement 
not be applied stringently, for example, to allow the supply of sub-standard products.176  
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One form of public corruption which has gained a significant amount of media attention in 
South Africa over the course of the last year is the issue of ‘state capture’177 and it is apposite 
to deliberate on its effect on public procurement. Defining ‘state capture’ as a concept is as 
challenging as defining corruption given the wide array of definitions however the following 
definition has been used by a number of European academics: 
‘[S]tate capture is a group phenomenon where by some members of the business and/or 
political elite appropriate some parts or functions of the state and use its resources to 
benefit the group while harming the public good.’178 
This broad definition of state capture does not distinguish between whether it is private 
businesses capturing the state, whether it is the state capturing private business interests or 
whether both is happening at simultaneously. In the context of public procurement, state 
capture tends to involve targeting organs of state or state-owned enterprises that control the 
distribution and performance of contracts for state functions as these are the primary sources 
from which funds can be extracted through improper conduct. When an organ of state or state-
owned enterprise is ‘captured’ by private interests it loses its autonomy to act in furtherance of 
public goals, thus losing its ability to enter into tender contracts which are competitive, cost-
effective or of a high quality.179 In other words, it prevents the procuring entity from being able 
to contract in accordance with the requirements set out in section 217(1) of the Constitution. 
State capture in public procurement may therefore be defined as institutionalised large-scale 
corruption centred on certain state organs or state-owned enterprises that cease to serve public 
goals and instead are used for the captor group’s own objectives.180  
What the many examples of corruption in the context of public procurement discussed above 
illustrate is that public corruption is arguably the most pervasive type of corruption which 
occurs in public procurement in South Africa. They cost the South African economy millions 
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and deprive citizens of access to infrastructure which will improve their quality of life and 
prevent the state from realising constitutional goals. These forms of corruption demonstrate 
why concerted steps have been taken to criminalise corruption in both international instruments 
and in South Africa’s legislation. What will follow is an analysis of the legislated regulatory 
mechanisms which aim to prevent corruption and improve transparency and accountability. 
2.3.3 Measures addressing corruption in public procurement  
There is a range of methods which the South African government can employ to combat 
corruption and these may be classified into administrative, social and regulatory measures. 
Administrative measures are ones which are not necessarily required by legislation but are 
permitted under the exercise of discretion which may be afforded to decision-makers procuring 
entities. Regulatory measures to prevent corruption are legislated and are therefore binding and 
obligatory – these are imposed where corruption is discovered and may include penal sanctions. 
Social measures refer to societal pressures such as shame and infamy which may be used  to 
deter persons from engaging in corruption when it is exposed.181  
Administrative measures vary and may include mechanisms which allow organs of state or 
state-owned enterprises to restrict bidding entities’ ability to obtain certain licenses, permits or 
approvals if they are found to be engaging in corrupt activities. On a broad level this may be 
as simple as refusing to register a bidder’s company where the bidder’s members have a history 
of bankruptcies, criminal or fraud convictions. Specifically, in public procurement, a procuring 
entity may take an administrative decision to deny a company the opportunity to bid for 
government tenders by forbidding registration on qualifying lists for public contracts.182 Pivotal 
to the administrative mechanisms is increased public sector financial management; this is 
evident in legislation such as the PFMA and the MFMA. The focus of these statutes is 
accountability. These pieces of legislation curtail corruption by legislating financial controls 
such as conflict of interest checks, specific auditing requirements and a multi-stage approval 
process during a competitive bidding process (as was discussed in detail above).  
Social measures against corruption refer to the strong feelings of contempt which society shows 
towards corruption. Social sanctions are by no means primary tools against corruption however 
their value cannot be understated. Where the media sensationalises corruption scandals and 
                                                 




publishes the names of those involved they are often subjected to shame, ridicule and disgrace. 
The negative publicity that results from such a conviction where it becomes public knowledge 
will frequently lead to a loss of business and, at worst, may even force the company to end 
business.183 
The regulatory measures include the legislation and any accompanying regulations which a 
government may adopt to prevent and punish corruption. A legal prohibition on corruption, 
bribery or other inducements means that those found guilty may face civil and criminal 
penalties and forfeitures. This may take the form of a fine or prison sentence which may be 
imposed during a criminal trial and a corrupt public official may lose his employment and 
forfeit related benefits of his or her job.184 Many jurisdictions around the world have 
criminalised corruption and South Africa is no exception.  In what follows, the penal measures 
in the Corruption Act will be discussed. 
2.3.3.1 The Corruption Act 
South Africa has implemented a robust and comprehensive policy to combat corruption as part 
of the broader effort to reduce crime in the country.185 One of these policies is the Public 
Service Anti-Corruption Strategy, which was developed to combat corruption in the public 
sector through a number of integrated methods which includes preventative, investigatory and 
persecutory measures.186 In so far as these polices deal with corruption in procurement, the 
proposals which they put forward were implemented through the enactment of the Corruption 
Act.187 
The Corruption Act defines the general offence of corruption,188 which was set out fully above, 
and creates offences which may be committed by defined categories of persons.189 With regard 
to the procurement context, the Corruption Act creates two unique offences190 and further 
forbids public officials from acquiring a private interest in a contract connected with a public 
                                                 
183 Ibid at 346. 
184 Ibid at 344.  
185 South African National Crime Prevention Strategy: Summary (1996) available at 
http://www.gov.za/documents/national-CRIME-prevention-strategy-summary (accessed 20 July 2016). 
186 The National Department of Public Works: Republic of South Africa, Anti-Fraud and Corruption Strategy, 
8th Revision (2013) available at http://goo.gl/baVF0O (accessed 20 July 2016).  
187 S. Williams & G. Quinot op cit (n 165) at 347 – 348. 
188 The Corruption Act op cit (n 164) at section 3. 
189 Ibid at sections 4 – 9. 
190 Ibid at sections 12 – 13. 
46 
 
body in which he or she is employed.191 There are also penalties for violations: those found 
guilty of corruption relating to procurement may be excluded from government contracts.192 In 
addition, they may also be convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment or a fine if convicted 
by the High Court or up to 18 years or a fine if convicted by a regional court.193 The 
exclusionary measures created by the Corruption Act will be discussed in greater detail in what 
follows. 
Section 28 of the Corruption Act deals with exclusion from public contracts. Section 28(1) 
provides that where a court finds a person found guilty of a procurement-related offence it may 
hand down an order that the particulars of the convicted person, the conviction as well as details 
of the offence may be publicised in the Register for Tender Defaulters (the ‘Register’).194 The 
Register is managed by National Treasury, is available online and contains information on 
companies and people excluded from government contracts. There are two offences that could 
lead to a person being placed on the Register. The first offence is ‘corrupt activities in relation 
to contracts’ and is directed at bribery which may occur during the procurement process. 195 It 
is defined to include situations where: 
‘…a person accepts or agrees to accept, offers or agrees to offer, or gives, any 
gratification, for his benefit or the benefit of another person, in order to influence in 
any way the promotion, execution or procurement of a contract with a public entity.’196  
The second offence is ‘corrupt activities in the procuring and withdrawal of tenders’ and it is 
related to situations where: 
‘…a person offers, agrees to offer or to accept, or accepts, any gratification as an 
inducement to or in order to influence another person to award a tender, make a tender 
or withdraw a tender for a contract.’197 
It is important to note that the two offences detailed above concern violations of the public 
procurement process – they exclude corrupt activity that may occur outside of this context, 
such as fraudulently obtaining licences or other documents, inducements intended to secure 
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waivers of fees or tax avoidance violations. It has been argued that the narrow range of offences 
in the Corruption Act may not be effective in ending public corruption as it only targets persons 
convicted of procurement-related corruption and government contractors. It also raises a 
further potential issue that the Corruption Act unfairly targets government contractors 
convicted of procurement corruption by imposing harsher sanctions than government 
contractors and other persons convicted of non-procurement related corruption.198 
The above criticism brings into focus the importance of the range of persons who may be 
subject to being placed on the Register and excluded from government contracts in terms of 
the Corruption Act. This has an important impact on the effectiveness of the provisions and in 
this regard the interpretation and application of section 28 of the Corruption Act are crucial. It 
has been argued that ensuring the efficacy of the provisions is to interpret section 28(1)(a) as a 
general provision which makes it mandatory to list all convicted persons on the Register. 
Section 28(1)(b) should then be interpreted to require (where the convicted person is an 
enterprise) listing of the particulars of any partner, manager, director or other person who 
wholly or partly exercises or may exercise control over that enterprise and who was involved 
in the offence concerned, or who knew or ought reasonably to have known or suspected that 
the enterprise committed the offence.199 Furthermore section 28(1)(c) must be read to require, 
in addition to the endorsement of the ‘primary convict’ under s 28(1)(a), listing on the Register 
the particulars of any other enterprise owned or controlled by the primary convict or the 
particulars of any partner, manager, director or other person, who wholly or partly exercises or 
may exercise control over such an enterprise, where that enterprise, partner, manager, director 
or other person was involved in the offence concerned or ought reasonably to have known or 
suspected that such other enterprise was involved in the offence concerned.200 
It is clear from the wide range of persons that may be listed on the Register in terms of the 
Corruption Act that government is cognisant of the fact that in practice companies do not 
necessarily stop bidding for government contracts because they have been barred. These 
persons generally circumvent the exclusion by bidding by using different corporate identities, 
different company officers or by using sub-contractors. The South African government’s robust 
response to these possibilities has been lauded as preferable because, in other jurisdictions, 
                                                 





while related persons may be excluded from bidding, such exclusion does not usually depend 
on the complicity, participation or knowledge of the related person. 
There are two further important considerations which relates to the efficacy of the Register as 
a mechanism to prevent convicted persons from bidding for government contracts. The first is 
the time period for which those persons are expected to be listed on the Register. Under the 
Corruption Act the National Treasury determines the period of time that a person will be listed 
on the Register and not the court who made the conviction. It has been argued that separating 
the court’s power to convict and order that the bidder be listed on the Register from the National 
Treasury’s power to impose a time period for enlistment may lead to delays between 
theconviction and when the bidder is made aware of the time period.201 The National Treasury 
will accordingly have to make a concerted effort to put mechanisms in place to prevent any 
delays. Where they do occur, the National Treasury should adjust the period of enlistment 
accordingly or alternatively the period of enlistment should be determined by the courts at the 
time that the order is handed down to minimize the risk of administrative delays.202  
The second consideration concerns the cancellation of ongoing contracts. Where a person has 
been listed on the Register, the National Treasury, after consultation with the relevant procuring 
entity and consideration of a range of factors listed in the Corruption Act, may terminate any 
agreement with the person subject to the enlistment.203 The power to terminate on-going 
contracts may have extensive consequences including whether or not the contractor will be 
paid for work completed or other benefits that the public body may have received under the 
contract. In addition, the question of whether the public body will be entitled to recover 
amounts paid in terms of the contract and who will bear the costs of the wasted procurement 
procedure and a possibly new procedure also arise.204 
Should a contract be terminated by a procuring entity on the grounds that a person has been 
convicted and enlisted on the Register, this may open government to a legal challenge by the 
affected bidder. Where the bidder was convicted on the basis that it was engaged in fraudulent 
conduct then the South African common law treats the contract as voidable on the ground of 
improperly obtained consent.205 However, should a court order that a person or enterprise other 
than the primary convict be enlisted on the Register, the termination of an active contract 
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following enlistment may not be justifiable.206 Should the corrupt conduct of a third party on 
an unrelated transaction lead to the enlistment of a party to an active tender, the validity of the 
termination of the contract would be doubtful under the common law. Notwithstanding this, it 
should however be noted that the Corruption Act circumscribes the termination powers of the 
National Treasury207 – only allowing termination where the enlistment applies to a convicted 
natural person, company or person in control of a company.208 A contract may not therefore be 
terminated where a person was listed on the Register because of a relationship with a convicted 
natural person or persons in charge of such a firm.  
With regard to the question of whether the public body will be entitled to recover amounts paid 
in terms of the contract; a contract that the procuring entity has been induced to enter on the 
basis of corruption is tainted with illegality of the underlying corrupt transaction between the 
official representing the procuring entity and the bidder. Consequently, outstanding payments 
may not be recovered on the basis of the rule denying payment under an illegal transaction.209 
In fact, it may also be possible for the procuring entity claim on the basis of the unjust 
enrichment of the contractor should it be able to prove that it has suffered loss and that the 
contractor has been enriched at its expense.210 
It is clear that the Corruption Act establishes a strong framework of exclusionary measures to 
ensure that in addition to any criminal sanctions which persons convicted of corruption may 
face, these persons will also be barred from benefiting from government contracts. This form 
of regulatory measure is pivotal in public procurement particularly given the large sums of 
money involved when government procures infrastructure. The deterrent effect that these 
measures should also not be understated as publicised lists of persons barred from bidding for 
government contracts and those convicted of corruption, fraud or other improper tender-related 
offences are available from the National Treasury. 
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Chapter 3 - Accountability in PPPs 
Outside of the exclusionary penal measures there are other regulatory measures which seek to 
create an environment where corruption cannot thrive by requiring transparency and 
accountability as a preventative step. It will be recalled from early on in this paper that in South 
Africa the elements of accountability and transparency have been afforded constitutional status 
in section 217(1). These elements are fundamental to public procurement in the country 
particularly given commitment to infrastructure development through PPPs.211 Legislated 
accountability and transparency measures such as maintaining proper financial records, 
developing clear performance outcomes and ensuring an efficient tender process are all central 
components to ensuring that PPP processes remain constitutionally compliant. However, 
despite the fact that PPPs should manifest mutual commitment and trust between government 
and the private sector, and whereby risk, rewards, resources, skills, expertise and finances are 
shared, it has been argued that PPPs can reduce accountability and undermine public control.212 
Below, some of the issues that pervade PPPs in South Africa will be discussed. This will 
include a discussion on the complexity of the legislation and policies governing PPPs, 
criticisms regarding the transparency of the system as well those concerning the monitoring 
and evaluation of PPPs. Naturally, commentary will include a discussion on enhancing 
accountability and transparency in PPPs and public procurement more broadly. Thereafter the 
paper will also provide a brief international comparison to demonstrate how India, a fellow 
commonwealth country facing similar developmental challenges, has addressed these issues. 
3.1. Challenges in accountability and transparency  
The overarching requirement for accountability and transparency in PPPs has already been 
discussed above in the context of the Constitution, as well as the different laws and policies in 
the PFMA, MFMA, PAJA as well as Regulation 16. This legal regime, in so far as it relates to 
accountability and transparency, has been subject to criticism on a number of levels. One of 
the criticisms is that the regime creates a cumbersome and complex procurement system which 
fosters a culture of rule-bending and the tendency to use corrupt means to avoid these rules.213 
In addition, because of the complexity of the system legislation and policies create, the roll-out 
of PPPs has been particularly slow. This can be demonstrated with reference to the 
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requirements set by the MFMA and the Municipal Systems Act which require feasibility 
studies to be undertaken before a municipality conducts PPPs. While feasibility studies 
undertaken in terms of  Section 78 of the MSA take approximately two years, in the MFMA it 
takes an average of six months. The result is that a municipality faced with the challenge of 
having to satisfy the requirements of both Acts might instead resort to creating partnerships 
with the private sector in ways that are not consistent with the conventional structure of 
PPPs.214 The result of the slow roll out is that on average, only two PPPs have been rolled out 
per year at national and provincial level since 2004, and the average period taken to complete 
a PPP ranges between 24 and 36 months.215 
Perhaps most central to ensuring accountability and transparency is the protection of the 
legitimate interests of all stakeholders and the duty to engage with these stakeholders at various 
stages of the procurement process. It has been argued that the legal regime does not adequately 
protect the legitimate interests of stakeholders during PPPs and that there is scant provision for 
input from citizens from inception to completion of a project.216 This may seem to be at odds 
with the criticism that the PPP process is not efficient as it could then be argued that the 
involvement of an affected community might further slowdown the PPP process because 
communities often do not speak with a unified voice and tend to be passive receivers of services 
rather than voluntary participants.217 However, excluding affected communities and even 
private companies who have legitimate interests in the procurement process only stands to 
undermine the accountability and transparency principles set out in the Constitution.  
Notwithstanding these constitutional requirements, several concerns have been raised which 
bolster the argument that there is a need for more robust procurement policies and legislative 
provisions on the matter. It was mentioned early on in this paper (and it is worth reiterating) 
that if the ‘transparency’ principle is to be realised during state procurement the process, PPPs 
must be guided by clear and codified criteria upon which decisions will be made and that 
decisions such as the one awarding the contract should be verifiable and publicised with 
reasons where appropriate. However, there are a number of stages in the PPP process where 
transparency may be compromised.  
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National Treasury Regulation 16.5.4 which was referred to above and which contains the 
requirements for obtaining Treasury Approval IIB provides one such example. It stipulates that 
after bids are evaluated but before the preferred bidder is appointed, the procuring entity must 
submit a report for approval by the relevant treasury which demonstrates how the criteria of 
affordability, value for money, and substantial technical, operational and financial transfer 
were applied in the evaluation of the bids in general and which demonstrates how the criteria 
were applied with respect to the preferred bid specifically. However, there is no mention of an 
evaluation committee for bid selection; neither is there any mention of the criteria for scoring 
the bids.218  
3.1.1. Transparency and accountability versus commercial confidentiality 
One aspect of the lack of transparency in PPPs which has received a substantial amount of 
media attention recently, is the non-disclosure of PPP arrangements between the public and 
private partners on the grounds of ‘commercial confidence’ protection of ‘property rights’ or 
on grounds of data protection.219 This naturally implicates transparency and for present 
purposes one of the most instructive recent examples of how a procuring entity tried to evade 
compliance with this constitutional principle during a tender process is in the case involving 
the South African National Roads Agency (‘SANRAL’) and the City of Cape Town (the 
‘City’).  
The case commenced in the Western Cape High Court220 and the salient facts are as follows: 
The City launched a judicial review in which it sought to set aside the declaration of parts of 
the N1 and N2 national roads as toll roads in terms of certain legislation. The City contended 
that the Minister of Transport’s decision to declare the roads as toll roads was irrational because 
the Minister approved the declaration of the roads without knowing what the cost of the project 
or the toll fees would be, and without considering whether the toll fees would be affordable, or 
whether tolling would be a financially sustainable or socio-economically appropriate.221 The 
City was granted an interdict prohibiting SANRAL from negotiating and concluding a contract 
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with the preferred bidder.222 SANRAL then launched an interlocutory application during the 
review proceedings seeking an order which would require the supplementary founding papers 
of the City of Cape Town in the pending review proceedings to be redacted so as to keep secret 
certain information which SANRAL contends should not be released in the public domain as 
negotiations with the preferred bidder had not yet been concluded. The information is derived 
from or is part of the relevant administrative record of decision in the review proceedings and 
publicising such information would not only compromise negotiations but also reveal 
commercially sensitive or proprietary trade information that the bidders might have included 
in their proposals.223  
The final ruling of Judge Binns-Ward in the High Court judgment concluded that SANRAL 
did not definitively make out a case to have its information kept secret.224 However, Judge 
Binns-Ward did rule that SANRAL was to be afforded confidentiality in terms of the “implied 
undertaking” rule. The application of this rule meant that the administrative record (as well as 
any quotes from it which may appear in the parties’ affidavits) could not be publicised or 
accessed via the court Registrar until such time as the review application was called and heard 
in court unless SANRAL gave its consent for prior disclosure.225 The City took the matter on 
appeal to the SCA where Justice Ponnan authored the unanimous decision of the court.226 the 
SCA made short shrift of the ‘implied undertaking’ rule which the High Court relied on and 
held that the rule is not part of our law.227 Justice Ponnan meticulously discussed the principle 
of open justice in South African law in light of the rich constitution jurisprudence on the subject 
and he further drew on the jurisprudence from a number of foreign jurisdictions. He held that 
courts are open to protect both those who use the judiciary and in order to secure the legitimacy 
of the judiciary and not to ‘satisfy the prurient interests of those who wish to examine the 
private details of others.’228 Accordingly, he held that the public is entitled to know exactly 
how the judiciary works and to be reassured that it always functions within the terms of the law 
and according to time-honoured standards of independence, integrity, impartiality and fairness. 
He then stated that 
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‘…the right of open justice must include the right to have access to papers and written 
arguments which are an integral part of court proceedings… That must follow 
axiomatically, it seems to me, because the public would hardly be in a position to 
properly assess the legitimacy or fairness of the proceedings if they could observe the 
proceedings in open court but were denied access to the documents that provide the 
basis for the court’s decision.’229 
The core of the SCA judgment was that court records, including those of review applications 
brought during public procurement processes are, by default, public documents which must be 
open to public scrutiny at all times.230 While there may be situations which justify a departure 
from the default position such as legitimate commercial confidentiality, should it be proved, 
any departure from the default position must be viewed as an exception which must be justified. 
The High Court’s judgment was ruled to be inconsistent with this principle – it limited the 
ability of litigants to ensure publicity when they challenge the actions of the state or state-owned 
entities. Thus where openness is most sorely needed – the consideration of government conduct – 
the High Court judgment was found to limits transparency the most.231 
The above exposition of the confidentiality dispute between SANRAL and the City serves to 
demonstrate how transparency and accountability is a frequently disputed and often highly 
publicised issue. Even before a tender is finally awarded, judicial review challenges throughout 
the process may occur. The manner in which commercially sensitive documents and 
proprietary information of both bidders and the procuring entity is handled bring the issue of 
transparency and accountability during the procurement process into focus. Accountability 
evidently remains a complex, elusive, abstract, multifaceted and contested issue.232 Fombad 
notes that understanding the different accountability relations and ensuring that all stakeholders 
are working towards reinforcing accountability and transparency throughout the procurement 
process is vital.233 In the context of public procurement, and specifically PPPs, the state or      
state-owned entity, private partners, elected officials and public officials understand each 
other’s needs and objectives and work together in an atmosphere of trust, mutual collaboration, 
shared responsibility, transparency and open communication responsible for accountability 
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during the procurement process.234 Of course there are situations where confidentiality must be 
maintained however the constitutional principles in section 217(1) must permeate the entire 
process. It must be borne in mind that citizens, government officials, Parliament, the electorate, 
the courts, tax payers, shareholders and the local community are the principal stakeholders. As 
a result, elected officials, politicians and administrators must be alive to their legal obligation 
to remain accountable throughout the process.235  
3.2 Improving accountability and transparency during the procurement process 
One of the fundamental steps that the South African government must take to improve 
accountability during the procurement process is to ensure that the responsibility for PPPs and 
other forms of tendering for infrastructure does not end once the contract is awarded. Steps 
should be taken to implement checks and balances throughout the lifespan of the agreement.236 
The transparency and accountability mechanisms promulgated by National Treasury’s PPP 
Unit are currently heavily centred on the pre-contractual stages of the procurement process and 
neglects post-project evaluation mechanisms.237 This creates a lacuna at the operational stage 
of the project, which is arguably where procuring entities require equally strong regulation to 
ensure that projects avoid issues like unjustifiable overspending, escalating costs and 
corruption. There are several key mechanisms which government could adopt to improve 
accountability during PPPs specifically and other forms of procurement more generally. 
Parliamentary oversight, administrative institutions, community monitoring as well as 
accountability structures may strengthen the procurement process and further the realisation of 
the objectives set out in section 217 of the Constitution.  
Parliamentary oversight could take the form of a dedicated PPP parliamentary committee. 
Through this committee Parliament would be vested with the power to scrutinise contracts 
between the public and private sector from inception to development stage and beyond to 
ensure that these contracts are legally compliant and that deliverables are realised efficiently 
and effectively. Any notable findings of this committee should be tabled in parliament and 
made available to the public, furthermore the committee should regularly disclose revenue 
figures from any of the concessions it awards. In this way, citizens will be able to engage with 
projects that government embarks upon and better understand reasons for price fluctuations of 
                                                 






goods and services and better appreciate their rights and obligations in relation to the 
projects.238 Transparency and accountability measures could be made even more robust as a 
dedicated committee would ensure that any adverse findings by National Treasury, a legal 
challenge or the Auditor-General are not dismissed but that they remain in the public discourse 
and the desired effect of correcting aberrations and improving operations.239 
Establishing administrative institutions to monitor the procurement process may also improve 
accountability. Apart from a procuring entity’s designated accounting officer, the primary 
monitoring agents for PPPs stipulated in the PPP Manual240 are the Auditor General and the 
National Treasury’s dedicated PPP Unit.  It has however been argued that accounting officers 
do not have direct authority over the private party contracting in the PPP, powers of the 
Auditor-General are vaguely defined and National Treasury may be considered a bureaucratic 
government department and should avoid becoming mired in the business of power and 
politics.241 Therefore to improve accountability, expanding the scope of the powers of the 
Auditor-General and creating other administrative institutions may be a solution. Expanding 
the powers of the Auditor-General must be guided by the principles drawn from the 
International Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions (‘INTOSAI’) and tailored for the 
South African context. India provides and instructive example of how to adopt INTOSAI 
guidelines and customise them accordingly to foster transparency and accountability.242 In this 
regard, the South African government expand the powers of the Auditor-General as follows: 
In addition to the Auditor-General’s current role of exercising financial supervision and control 
over the delivery of PPPs, he or she should also be able to investigate post-contractual 
operational matters such as environmental issues and administrative and managerial problems. 
Moreover, the office of the Auditor-General could also serve as a point of contact between 
government agencies and the public by allowing the public to submit complaints or problems 
requiring the investigation of accountability.243 
With regard to creating a dedicated administrative institution, these should ideally first be 
created within the management structures of each PPP and they should be tasked with 
monitoring the proper implementation of the PPP, conducting operational review meetings, 
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and presenting quarterly reports on the project.244 These internal structures could report broadly 
to the PPP Unit and, to increase its capacity, a further independent division of the PPP Unit 
which could be created to oversee, monitor, evaluate and audit the procurement, 
implementation and development of projects. This could also take the form of an entirely 
independent monitoring institution comprised of members of the public and private sector who 
have considerable expertise in the area of infrastructure development but no vested interest.245 
Community monitoring should play a central role in any procurement process and robust 
engagement and participation by the community in the policy would add to increasing 
transparency and accountability. Communities must be informed through awareness campaigns 
and clear channels of communication must be established and maintained throughout the 
procurement process. The role of the media in this regard cannot be understated. In addition, 
elected officials, administrators and project managers must remain alive to their responsibility 
to give reasons, explain publicly, fully and fairly to the citizens how they are carrying out 
responsibilities that affect the public. Community feedback mechanisms such as independent 
reviews and social surveys should become legislated and institutionalised to serve as a check 
and balance during the procurement process.246  
Improving accountability and transparency mechanisms will go a long way in curtailing the 
challenges discussed earlier on in this paper. Several measures could be adopted in order to 
ensure that service delivery is improved and that issues such as corruption and the abuse of 
public authority is eliminated. In addition, it is worth reiterating that improving accountability 
is a primary step to ensuring that the objectives set out in section 217(1) of the Constitution are 
realised. Bolstering monitoring mechanisms through any of the aforementioned means 
improves compliance with the requirement for procurement which is fair, equitable, 
transparent, competitive and cost-effective. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has endeavoured to provide an analysis of the regulatory regime governing public 
procurement in South Africa with particular reference to the procurement of infrastructure and 
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the delivery of other basic services to citizens. Since the advent of democracy the South African 
government and state-owned enterprises have sought to partner with the private sector through 
specialised contractual procurement mechanisms such as PPPs to aid in the delivery of 
infrastructure and amenities. Given that the delivery of infrastructure and basic services 
necessarily implicates constitutional rights such as access to housing, water and sanitation, 
amongst many others, it is therefore unsurprising that the overarching principles governing 
public procurement have also been afforded constitutional status in section 217. These 
principles have formed the basis of a body of laws and policies which regulate public 
procurement at national, provincial and local levels. The courts have similarly emerged as key 
role players as this relatively new body of law frequently requires them to interpret and rule on 
contentious issues.  
The tensions within the public procurement regulatory regime formed the basis of this paper, 
which commenced with an overview of the constitutional principles which permeate the 
regime. The objectives of fairness, efficiency, cost-effectiveness, competitiveness, equity, 
transparency and accountability were all discussed in detail. Following which, the legislative 
framework which encompasses the PPPFA, PFMA, MFMA were also discussed as these 
statutes form the basis of a typical infrastructure procurement process. The paper then turned 
to discuss a typical PPP procurement process from the pre-contractual phase to the conclusion 
of the PPP agreement with the preferred bidder – this process is predominantly governed by 
the National Treasury’s regulations and guidelines. Understanding this process is fundamental 
to understanding the challenges which are inherent in public procurement and it is these 
challenges which formed the basis of the next portion of the paper.  
Three issues which impact the delivery of infrastructure through public procurement processes 
were highlighted. Firstly, the lack of knowledge, skills and capacity prevalent in many state 
organs and state-owned enterprises was discussed. Finding skilled professionals with 
appropriate knowledge was acknowledged as a key driver in preventing poor governance. 
Secondly, non-compliance with laws, regulations and tender conditions was discussed. It was 
demonstrated that given the extensive regime of laws, regulations and policies that governs 
public procurement and specifically PPPs in South Africa, it is therefore unsurprising that the 
issue of non-compliance with the various processes remained a challenge. In this regard, the 
paper examined how increasing the level of discretion afforded to procuring entities along the 
lines envisaged in the UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement as well as World Bank 
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Guidelines would mitigate issues around non-compliance with tender conditions. In addition, 
the paper provided an overview of how courts have attempted to mitigate the stringent wording 
of the definition of ‘acceptable tender’ used in the PPPFA. The third challenge discussed was 
the ever-present issue of corruption in public procurement. The paper highlighted the various 
forms of corruption which frequently occur in South Africa, including the impact of state-
capture on public procurement, and then went on to discuss the penal and preventative 
mechanisms employed in the Corruption Act. An overview of the administrative, social and 
regulatory mechanisms was provided and the paper then turned to focus on the mechanism of 
excluding those convicted of corruption from contracting with government and the efficacy of 
the Register kept by National Treasury which lists offenders. 
Finally, the paper turned more broadly to improving accountability in PPPs in South Africa. It 
is certainly arguable that this singular aspect is the most essential mechanism to ensuring that 
public procurement challenges are prevented. Argument was put forward that there is a need 
for more robust procurement policies and legislative provisions. This brings into focus one of 
the key tensions in accountability and transparency – the issue of commercial confidentiality 
during the tender process amidst legal challenges – and the example set by the SANRAL case 
is instructive. As a final point, attention must be drawn to the mechanisms which were proposed 
which government could adopt to improve accountability during PPPs specifically and other 
forms of procurement more generally. Namely, parliamentary oversight, the creation of 
administrative institutions, community monitoring as well as accountability structures could 
all be implemented to strengthen the procurement process and further the realisation of the 
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